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ABSTRACT 
The report gives first an outline of the present status and of the future 
trends in nuclear energy development in the six Member States of the European 
Community and in the frame of its future enlargement. Emphasis is placed 
upon the technical safety aspects, the siting and environmental considerations 
and the implications for mankind as compared to conventional hazardous 
industries. 
The radioactive effluents routinely released at present by nuclear power 
and reprocessing plants are investigated and the future increase estimated on 
the basis of : 
- the second Community Target Nuclear Programme; 
- typical BWR and PWR releases, and 
- the nuclear capacity installed assuming that half of it being of the PWR 
type and the other half of the BWR type. 
It was found that only the noble gas releases in the gaseous effluent streams 
give rise to special supplementary precautions, justified not really by global 
effects through gradual build up in the biosphere and the atmosphere, but 
rather by local or regional effects in the vicinity of the plants. 
Finally it is concluded that at present the record of the nuclear power 
industry is, compared to conventional hazardous industries, extremely 
favourable from the point of view of human injury from gaseous and 
effluent releases for the professionally exposed as well as for the general public. 
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Preamble and General Conclusions 
A - PRESENTATION 
The present report gives first an outline of the current status of the future trends in nuclear 
power development in the Six Member States of the European Community and in the frame of 
its enlargement to Nine countries. 
The quantified effects of the growth of nuclear production and associated industries from 
the standpoint of routine occupational exposure, effluent releases and waste accumulation and 
disposal-on the environmental issues of interest to mankind, are assessed with regard to the 
forecast development within the Community and extrapolated and examined on a world-wide 
scale. 
With any human activity-be it on an individual or collective scale-corresponds a risk 
which can be qualitatively or to a certain degree of precision quantitatively assessed. The same 
applies to the peaceful applications of nuclear energy. This report summarizes some data and 
ideas which may help in appreciating the nuclear safety record and risk-now and in the future-
under routine operation and in potential accident conditions, as compared to other risks to which 
modern society is exposed and most of which are readily accepted. 
The topics dealt with have been grouped into 6 chapters, each forming an entity: 
Chapter I : Nuclear power forecasts 
Chapter II : Radioactive effluents from a growing nuclear industry 
- Chapter III : Radioactive waste storage and accumulation - or processing wastes 
- Chapter IV : Thermal waste from nuclear power production 
- Chapter V : Accident potential, accident prevention and limitation of the possible 
consequences 
- Chapter VI : Nuclear hazards in relation to other risks. 
The references used are grouped per chapter, i.e. : according to their main application. 
Sometimes they apply to other chapters; in such a case this has been mentioned. Most of the 
references have been explicitly indicated at the relevant place, when they were applied; however, 
those of more widespread application have not been quoted explicitly in the text. 
The opinions expressed by the authors of the present report do not necessarily engage the 
views of the Commission of the European Communities. 
B - GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
On the basis of the quantitative data and findings outlined in the various chapters of the 
present report the following summarizing conclusions can be put forward. 
1. The standards of radiation protection applied in nuclear industry for the professionally exposed 
as well as for the general public are fixed in a cautious and conservative manner. It is only 
recently that an analogous conservative approach starts to be applied for numerous other 
sources of man-made pollution (conventional power and industry, consumption goods, etc.). 
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2. From all the radioactive effluents routinely released at present by nuclear power and reprocess-
ing plants only the noble gas releases in the gaseous effluent streams give rise to special 
supplementary precautions. 
With growing energy requirements and an expanding nuclear industry on a medium- and 
long-term basis, the only nuclides which will imply more of this special caution will be KrS5, 
Xe133 (noble gases in the gaseous effluents and-to a lesser extent-H3 in the liquid ef-
fluents (as well as gaseous effluents at reprocessing sites). This caution will be justified, 
not really by global (or overall planetary) effects through gradual build up in bio- and atmos-
phere, but rather by local or regional effects in the vicinity of the plants. 
Supplementary hold-up and retention equipment for noble gases is most likely to be further 
developed and applied in the following decades in multi-unit power production sites and 
larger-capacity reprocessing plants (5-10 t/day). The long-term prospects of using more 
plutonium-fuels may influence the problem near reprocessing sites, because of a foreseeable 
shorter decay time of the irradiated fuel before processing starts. 
For large-size reprocessing plants and multi-unit power plant sites, the tritium releases may 
also have to be reduced in the long run by appropriate retention means yet to be developed. 
It could be that the determining factor would be the Tritium released with the off-gas streams 
from such reprocessing plants rather than the liquid effluents. 
The application of such supplementary hold-up or retention equipment should after all be 
carefully weighed in general and in each particular case. Indeed, will the apparent supple-
mentary direct gain in protection of the population justify a possible relaxing in the protection 
and dose-burden of the occupationally exposed and increases in medium level waste volumes 
to be treated, handled, stored, transported to burial grounds and possibly disposed of? 
3. The global contribution of routine operation of nuclear power production facilities and 
associated industry in the radiation burden to the population at large (as a whole) is at present 
and will remain for the next century a small fraction (less than 1 %) of the total natural and 
man-made radiation (mainly from medical purposes). This remains valid even assuming 
that within that period of time no special hold-up or retention equipment were developed 
for the noble gases and tritium. 
4. The waste heat to be dissipated in growing quantity in the aquatic environment (thermal 
pollution) of thermal power plants (conventional as well as nuclear) does not seem to be a 
problem on the planetary scale and on a medium and long-term time scale. Locally however 
-in particular for multi-unit sites or for (semi-) urban areas-careful site selection and/or 
artificial cooling methods will become more and more necessary. This will not be facilitated 
because of landscaping considerations or fog (and smog) formation possibilities connected 
with the use of cooling towers. 
It is not excluded that-in connection with these problems-the use of sea-shore or off-
shore sites be increased especially in countries where this is feasible and economically attrac-
tive. 
With respect to the local effects, the standards proposed in various countries-for all types 
of thermal power plants and other industries producing residual heat-have resulted so far 
only in rather general guidelines which merit to become gradually more detailed, in particular 
as a result of research and by the development of dispersion models and correlated methods 
of calculation. 
No discrimination should be made, in connection with residual heat rejection, against the 
nuclear generation of power as more particularly worrying source of pollution as compared to 
conventional industries. 
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5. The utmost precautions taken to limit strictly the releases of radioactive effluents from 
nuclear energy applications so as to protect adequately the general public, have as a conse-
quence the treatment and accumulation of medium and high level wastes. 
The well-controlled presently applied temporary storage at the plant sites is not a cause of 
concern to the public. 
With growing energy demand, the accumulated volumes of these hazardous industrial 
wastes will increase in importance, and ultimate disposal methods will have to be sought for. 
The highly radioactive fission products wastes from fuel reprocessing operation are the most 
difficult to handle although the foreseeable volume will not be exceedingly large. 
Compacting, solidification and disposal methods are already in an advanced stage of develop-
ment and will presumably be ready for large scale application within the next decade or two. 
The medium level wastes-although from the radioactivity standpoint less of a problem-
may after all constitute a more complex problem as they are largely produced at the nuclear 
power production sites (rather than at the fuel reprocessing sites) and therefore the foreseeable 
accumulated volumes are much larger than in the case of the high level wastes. This implies 
also more frequent transportation requirements in connection with central cemetery storage 
and/or ultimate disposal. 
This problem will also have to be solved within the next decades. It should be borne in 
mind however that the long-term problem of this type of waste is not exceptional for the 
nuclear industry. In fact, it is to be compared with the even more voluminous hazardous 
wastes produced and accumulated by conventional hazardous industries (e.g. chemicals such 
as cyanides), which are at present less controlled than their nuclear equivalent. 
6. At present the record of the nuclear power industry is, compared e.g. to conventional hazard-
ous industries, extremely favourable from the point of view of human injury or casualties 
resulting from the accident situations. This is true for the professionally exposed as well as 
for the general public. 
This is due to a large extent to the stringent administrative and technical safety analysis and 
quality control requirements applied, of which seldom an equivalent counterpart is found 
in conventional hazardous activities. 
Besides the severe 'radiation protection standards' referred to under paragraph 1 above, the 
gradual further development of 'technological safety standards' is also a requisite of main-
taining this degree of safety in a growing nuclear industry. 
New technological developments (e.g. FBR's) and higher power ratings will, with increased 
nuclear power requirements, necessitate amplification of associated research programmes and 
stimulate quantitative 'risk-potential' assessment (sec. par. 8 below). Again the present 
trend in this is already now of such importance that no equivalent counterpart is found in 
the conventional hazardous activities. 
7. The growing number of nuclear power production plants will require within the next decade the 
development of more (than is presently the case) generally applicable site selection require-
ments based on 'routine' as well as 'abnormal conditions', health and safety considerations. 
The growing fraction of population 'at risk' (living in the vicinity of a nuclear facility, as 
compared to the total population) is one of the factors which may contribute to applying in the 
future also the integrated 'man-rem' concept into 'radiation standard' requirements for 
siting purposes (see also par. 8 below). 
8. An illustrative comparison of the present 'risk-potential' of nuclear energy to the professionally 
exposed as well as to the general public-as compared to the risks generally accepted in modem 
society--confirm, its very favourable position with regard to 'normal operation' conditions 
and indicates its comfortable position with regard to 'abnormal or accident' conditions. 
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With the future expansion of nuclear power production programmes this will readily remain 
so for 'normal' operation (see e.g. chapter II), although the professionally exposed will be 
subject to an increased integrated man-rem consumption. This may in the long run become 
another incentive of applying this integrated dose concept, besides the 'individual' require-
ments (see par. 7 above). 
On a medium- and long-term basis also, the 'accident'-potential should normally remain 
within the present range because there is no reason to believe that the measures and pre-
cautions outlined under 6 above will in the future be relaxed. It is likely however that 
'probabilistic approaches' including for instance also the 'man-rem' concept~will be particu-
larly useful to define more precisely the total nuclear risk and to weigh it versus the benefit 
gained for mankind and versus other accepted risks which are not necessarily compensated 
by a benefit. 
9. It may be pointed out that the stringent safety precautions and environmental protection 
measures which have always been standard practice in nuclear technology also have a bene-
ficial effect through their gradually more frequent application in conventional activities, for 
example the use and intensive development of diffusion models and calculation programmes 
in the field of ecology, geology, hydrology and meteorology in general, or the systematic 
safety analyses in hazardous activities. 
10. Now that human society is, quite rightly, devoting more and more attention to its environ-
ment, it is to nuclear energy that it must turn, since in the long term, the use of most of 
the other sources of power is likely to become prohibitive from this point of view. Any delay 
in development in this direction caused, for example, by strictly psychological and not 
objective considerations, can only damage the cause of environmental protection instead of 
furthering it. 
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CHAPTER I 
Nuclear power forecasts 
Nuclear power production forecasts have always to be dealt with applying a certain caution : 
the starting purpose of the predictions and the assumptions used can be different from one forecast 
to another. 
Two examples of recent forecasts have been used here as a check basis for further consider-
ations. 
1. The second •Target' Nuclear programme for the European Community (Ref. 1) -
Forecast No 1 
As pointed out by its title, this programme which was issued by the European Commission 
in 1972 sets out a 'target' on one hand taking into account the trend of nuclear power development 
versus coal, petroleum products, natural gas, geothermal and hydro power and assuming on the 
other hand that necessary measures be really taken to eliminate a number of barriers which hinder 
the requisite speeding up of nuclear plant constructions and operations. 
In summary this Target programme makes the following forecast up to 1985 for the original 
Six Member States of the Community: 
TABLE 1 
Year Power (Thousands of MWe) 
1970 3.2 
1972 5.5 
1U75 12.0 
1980 45.0 
1985 100.0 
These estimates are based partly on projections from the units either already producing or 
firmly decided or under construction. No allowance is made in this case, for possible delays in 
the presently established scheme by the utilities and/or within a national energy programme. 
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2. Forecast of growth of nuclear power - world-wide Forecast (Without USSR and other 
Communist countries) - Forecast No 2 
This forecast prepared by the USAEC Division of Operation Analysis and Forecasting 
(WASH -1139 Reactors; TID - 4500) was issued in January 1971 (Ref 2). 
It is in fact optimized towards the requirements for nuclear fuel (from ore and separative 
enrichment work, including assumptions on a certain amount of plutonium recycle). 
From this forecast the data are summarized in Table II up to 1985 for the Community of 
Six Member States, the enlarged Community (9 Member States as of January 1st 1973) the other 
countries of Western Europe, the USA, Canada and Japan. 
The indication 'enriched' refers generally to power plants using light water reactors, the 
indication 'natural' refers to power plants of the gas cooled or heavy water moderated type. 
TABLE 2 
Estimate of cumulative capacity of nuclear power plants in Western Europe 
as compared with forecast for USA, Canada and Japan 
(Up to 1985 - thousands of MWe) 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1972 1973 1974 
Belgium (Luxembourg) 
Enriched 0.1 0.9 2.6 4.2 0.1 0.1 0.5 
Natural - - - - - - -
Total 0.1 0.9 2.6 4.2 0.1 0.1 0.5 
France 
Enriched 0.2 1.2 6.3 14.4 0.2 0.2 0.8 
Natural 1.3 2.5 2.5 2.5 1.8 1.8 2.5 
Total 1.5 3.7 8.8 16.9 2.0 2.0 3.3 
Germany (West) 
Enriched 0.8 5.9 15.6 31.3 0.9 2.2 2.2 
Natural - - - - - - -
Total 0.8 5.9 15.6 31.3 0.9 2.2 2.2 
Italy 
Enriched 0.4 0.4 4.1 9.4 0.4 0.4 0.,1 
Natural 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Total 0.6 0.6 4.3 9.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 
Netherlands 
Enriched 0.1 0.5 2.3 5.2 0.1 0.1 0.5 
Natural - - - - - - -
Total 0.1 0.5 2.3 5.2 0.1 0.1 0.5 
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TABLE 2 (continued) 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1972 1973 1974 
Community of 6 
Enriched 1.6 8.9 30.9 64.5 1.7 3.0 4.4 
Natural 1.5 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.0 2.0 2.7 
Total 3.1 11.6 33.6 67.2 3.7 5.0 7.1 
United Kingdom (Eire) 
Enriched 0.1 5.4 19.6 43.1 0.8 2.2 4.1 
Natural 4.6 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2 
Total 4.7 10.6 24.8 48.3 6.0 7.4 9.3 
Denmark 
Enriched - - 0.8 2.6 - - -
Natural - - - - - - -
Total - - 0.8 2.6 - - -
Community of 9 
Enriched 1. 7 14.3 51.3 110.2 2.5 5.2 8.5 
Natural 6.1 7.9 7.9 7.9 7.2 7.2 7.9 
Total 7.8 22.2 59.2 118.1 9.7 12.4 16.4 
--· 
Austria 
Enriched - - 1.3 2.0 - - -
Natural - - - - - - -
Total - - 1.3 2.0 - - -
Finland 
Enriched - - 1.0 2.6 - - -
Natural - - - - - - -
Total - - 1.0 2.6 - - -
Norway 
Enriched - - 0.5 1.6 - - -
Natural - - - - - - -
Total - - 0.5 1.6 - - -
Portugal 
Enriched - - 0.3 0.6 - - -
Natural - - - - - - -
Total - - 0.3 0.6 - - -
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TABLE 2 (continued) 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1972 1973 1974 
Spain 
Enriched 0.6 0.6 5.6 13.3 0.6 0.6 0.6 
Natural - 0.4 0.4 0.4 - 0.4 0.4 
' 
Total 0.6 1.0 6.0 13.7 0.6 1.0 1.0 
Sweden 
Enriched 0.4 2.7 7.9 16.6 0.4 0.4 1.2 
Natural - - - - - - -
----
Total 0.4 2.7 7.9 16.6 0.4 0.4 1.2 
Switzerland 
Enriched 0.4 2.0 4.4 7.5 0.7 1.0 1.4 
natural - - - - - - -
----
Total 0.4 2.0 4.4 7.5 0.7 1.0 1.4 
Other countries of Western 
Europe 
Enriched 1.4 5.3 17.9 37.4 1.7 2.0 3.2 
Natural - 0.4 0.4 0.4 - 0.4 0.4 
Total 1.4 5.7 18.3 37.8 1.7 2.4 3.6 
USA 
Total 5 59 150 299 19 32 46 
Canada 
Enriched - - - - - - -
Natural 0.2 2.6 7.8 17 1.6 2.1 2.6 
Total 0.2 2.6 7.8 17 1.6 2.1 2.6 
Japan 
Enriched - 4.9 20.6 48.8 1.1 1.6 2.8 
Natural 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Total 0.2 5.1 20.8 49.0 1.3 1.8 3.0 
Similar to the 'Community Target Programme' this forecast has been based on electrical 
generating capacity installed, firmly decided or under construction up to approximately 1977 
and on further extrapolation (average percent increase per year) from 1978 onwards. 
However in this forecast more conservatism has been built in. For instance, up to about 
1975 (depending on the period for which information is available) the plants have been 
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assumed to start commercial operation in the year following the one 'predicted' by the utilities, 
in order to take in account delays (e.g. less experience, construction and licensing delays). 
Subsequently the 'predicted' schedule has been assumed for the US forecast, whilst the one 
year delay has been maintained for all the other countries. 
Furthermore the USAEC forecast does not take into account improvements in the matter 
of hindrances in nuclear power plant development, which the 'Community Target programme' 
presumes as a prerequisite for the validity of its forecast, such as subdivision of the market in 
national areas, discrepencies in technical and safety standards, spread of construction industries, 
lengthy procedures due to implementation of safety and environmental requirements. 
The USAEC report also indicates that for instance taking account of the lessons learned 
from previous forecasts, it would be better to speak about 'ranges' of installed MWe especially 
the further one moves into the future. For instance this leads for the USA to a range of 
130 thousands of MWe to 170 thousands of MWe at the end of 1980, and of 260 thousands of 
MWe to 330 thousands of MWe at the end of 1985 (as compared with respectively 150 OOO and 
299 OOO MWe in 1980 and 1985). For the other forecasts, grouping several countries, the possible 
spread (or error) versus the total estimate figures arrived at in table 2 could be of the order - 20% 
and + 10% in 1980 and of the order of ± 15% in 1985. 
3. Comparison of the recent Forecasts 1 and 2 
It can be noted that up to 1975 forecasts 1 and 2 are largely corresponding. However 
the indications for 1980 and 1985 for the Community countries are in forecast 2 significantly 
lower than in forecast 1. The 'Community Target programme' estimates are even higher than the 
upper level range of error for the USAEC forecast. This can-as already indicated-be ex-
plained by the difference in scope and basic assumptions in the forecasts and by the inherently 
conservative approach in the USAECestimate. Also the provisions for Italy, 1 France and Germany 
for the period 1980-1985 are in the USAEC forecast low by over 1/3 as compared to the national 
forecasts referred to in the 'Community Target programme'. 2 This leads by itself to a difference 
of as much as 29 thousands of MWe between the two forecasts for 1985. 
4. Medium and long-term assumptions chosen for the safety and environmental 
implications 
For the purpose of further considerations in this report, the estimations retained for the 
total nuclear energy forecasts up to 1985 (medium-term forecasts) will be those of the 
·Community Target programme', as seen from the point of view of the safety and environ-
mental implications-this implies the more 'conservative' assumptions. 
In the same perspective for the period 1985-2000 (long-term forecasts), the following 
assumptions can be taken. 
Within the Community of Six at present half the nuclear power units use the light water 
reactor type (LWR). It is expected that this type would cover 75% of nuclear energy production 
in 1975 to reach practically 100% in 1980 (cfr. also USAEC forecast). 
1 According to Ref. 3 : 1975 
1980 
1985 
1 400 MWe 
6 500 MWc 
20 OOO MWe 
2 In 1985: West Germany 45 OOO M\Ve 
France 27 OOO MWe 
Italy 16 OOO l\1We. 
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For the Community of Nine the cross-over will be slower and the ultimate proportion of 
light water reactors for that period will depend on the decisions to be made for the UK nuclear 
power policy (Ref. 4). 
Year 
1990 
1995 
2000 
TABLE 3 
Community of Six 
210 
380 
620 
(Thousands of MW e) 
Community of Nine 1 
315 
570 
930 
1 Arrived at by projecting the USAEC forecasts for UK-Denmark-Eire with nuclear 
power growth factors applied for the Community of 6. 
It is expected that other types of reactors (e.g. fast breeders HTGCR) will start 
contributing significantly within the Community of Six around 1985. Again this may occur 
earlier for the Community of Nine depending for instance on the UK programme. 
With regard to the latter uncertainties, the further considerations in the present paper 
have been optimized towards reactors of the light water cooled type (LWR). This should 
anyhow give a reasonable estimate of the pollution potential from nuclear power in normal 
(routine) operation conditions, and in accident situations, bearing in mind that gas cooled 
reactors, heavy water reactors, or fast breeders may be more advantageous in some aspects and 
less in others. 
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CHAPTER II 
Radioactive effluents from a growing nuclear industry 
A - THE RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENTS PRODUCED IN ROUTINE OPERATION 
OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS : RADIATION STANDARDS, CURRENT 
PRACTICE, MEDIUM- AND LONG-TERM FORECASTS 
1. Radiation protection standards - e.g. EURATOM standards 
The purpose of Euratom's radiation standards is to protect man against the somatic and 
genetic effects connected with exposure to ionizing radiation. They relate to the following 
three categories of persons : 
(1) persons professionally exposed, i.e. : those persons who, by reason of the performance of their 
professional duties, are exposed to ionizing radiation. 
(2) members of the population, who may be more sensitive to the effects of ionizing radiation, 
such as children or pregnant women and persons adjacent to nuclear installations (some-
times called population 'at risk'), for whom the standards will therefore have to be stricter. 
(3) the population at large 1, for whom the setting of standards is essentially determined by 
genetic considerations. 
These standards, which were drawn up and are revised periodically on the basis of the 
recommendations of the International Commission for Radiological Protection (ICRP) have 
been and are being used by the Member States of the Community in drawing up their own 
regulations. 
The radiation protection standards consist of basic standards, i.e. : those specifying the 
maximum permissible levels of exposure and the principles governing their application. They 
also include derived limits, such as the maximum permissible concentrations of radionuclides in 
the atmosphere or in drinking water. 
These radiological dose limits may not be regarded as threshold values below which there 
will be no somatic or genetic effects : for all such effects, the starting point used is a linear 
dose/effect relationship. From this is derived the essential principle of radiation protection : 
'the exposure of persons, and the number of persons exposed to ionizing radiation must be 
kept as low as practicable (Ref. 1)'. 
2. The application of radiation protection standards in the generation of nuclear 
power - actual release experience from power plants 
In applying these standards, a distinction must be made between persons professionally 
exposed to radiation and the general public. 
1 By population 'at large' is meant here the population as a whole, i.e. : professionally exposed, so called 
population 'at risk' (adjacent to nuclear installations), and the rest of the population. 
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Persons professionally exposed to radiation in the field of the generation of nuclear power 
are exposed to both external and internal radiation. 
Experience has shown that, in nuclear power stations, internal contamination of 
personnel occurs only rarely. On the other hand, external radiation often gives rise to 
problems with regard to the respect of the radiation protection standards, especially in the case 
of inspections, maintenance and repair (Ref. 2). This is mainly because provisions are not 
always made at the design stage for access to and the maintenance of various components. The 
result may be that the operator of the installation is forced to make use of outside labour in order 
to avoid over-exposing its own staff, and this, in turn, can raise problems relating to e.g. : 
(i) the psychological preparation of such outside labour; 
(ii) their training in matters of radiation protection; 
(iii) the detailed planning of the scheduled work; 
(iv) accounting for the time spent working in controlled areas and the doses received. 
It should be noted that, in order to eliminate these difficulties, the Commission of the 
European Communities (CEC) has decided to have studies carried out of the measures which 
can be taken, both at the design stage and in practice, in nuclear power stations to reduce the 
degree of exposure to radiation of maintenance and inspection staff (Ref. 3). 
For comparison's sake it may be pointed out this time that in fuel processing plants the 
occupational exposure hazard may be considered somewhat higher but the number of 
installations is and will remain much lower. 
The population living in the vicinity of nuclear power installations are subject to the 
hazard of exposure to the gaseous or liquid radioactive effluents discharged into the 
environment by these installations. 
Here, a distinction must be made between the effluents from nuclear power stations and 
that from nuclear fuel processing plants (dealt with in section II.B. below). 
The gaseous effluents from nuclear power stations, particularly water-cooled reactors, 
contain radioactive noble (or rare) gases, mainly: Xe133 and Kr85, and sometimes also radio-
active iodine and aerosols (particulates). 
In BWR's the gaseous effluents originate generally from the condenser air ejector, the 
gland seal, the turbine building and the mechanical vacuum pump. The major portion 
originates from the condensor air ejector and because of the relatively short hold-up time 
(about 30 min), the contribution of short-lived isotopes of Krypton such as Kr85 and KrBB and 
of Xenon such as Xe133, Xel35, Xel38 is still significant at the time of release. 
The application of supplementary retention by recombiner and charcoal delay systems 
for the condensor air ejector systems reduces the released activity by a factor 10-20. 
In PWR's the gaseous effluents originate generally from the gas processing system, the 
steam-generator blow-down vent, the auxiliary building and containment purging. Usually 
4 containment purges are assumed for the purpose of calculation; 0.25% leaking fuel and about 
75 1 leakage from primary to secondary are usually also considered. Because of the long 
hold-up time (around 45 days) of the radioactive gaseous effluents from the gas processing system 
the short-lived isotopes of Kr and Xe have mostly decayed, so only Kr85 and Xe133 contribute 
significantly in this case. 
In the case of advanced gas cooled reactors the essential source of gaseous effluents is 
the primary coolant purification system, with almost all the activity due to Kr85 (expected: 
about 3 CI/MWe-year; Ref. 7, chapter III). For the more conventional types of gas cooled 
reactors mainly Ar41 contributes, formed by neutron activation of Ar40 present in C02• 
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For the liquid metal fast breeder also almost 3 Ci/MWe - year (Kr85 essentially) is expected, 
assuming 1 % of failed fuel (Ref. 8, chapter III). 
The liquid effluents contain mixed fission products, corrosion products and tritium. 
By way of example Table IV lists a survey of the discharges made the last years from a 
number of nuclear power plants within the Community. The data summarized here have been 
obtained from published information, specially references (4, 5, 6, 12, 13, 14, 54, 55, 56 and 57). 
Other full and accurate data have recently been published more extensively, on the 
normal discharge rates of gaseous and liquid effluents from nuclear power stations in operation 
(especially in the US), mainly for the years 1968, 1969 and 1970 (Ref. 11 through 24). 
Upon examination of the values reported, one can summarize these grossly as follows : 
1. Gaseous effluents 
(a) noble and activation gases 
typical values for a BWR 1 : range between 104 and 106 Ci/year 
(102 to 104 Ci/MWe - year) 
typical values for a PWR : up to 104 Ci/year 
(up to ea. 10 Ci/MWe - year). 
(b) aerosols ea. 50-100 mCi/year (2). 
(c) halogens generally less than ea. 0.5 Ci/year. 
2. Liquid effluents 
(a) mixed fission and corrosion products (tritium excluded) : less than 10 Ci/year to a few 
tens of Ci/year. 
Typical values: ea. 0.03 Ci/MWe - year. 
(b) Tritium: a few tens (BWR) to thousands (PWR) of Curies. 
Typical values for PWR: ea. 0.05 Ci/MWe - year. 
Typical values for PWR: 10-20 Ci/MWe - year. 
To have an idea of what these activity releases represent in terms of population exposure, 
one has to know the different pathways through which the activity can reach man. 
For the gaseous effluents the principal ways of exposure are: 
- external irradiation by the radioactive cloud; 
- inhalation of radioactive aerosols and iodine; 
- consumption of milk contaminated with iodine-131 (through the chain air-grass-cow-milk). 
1 Lower limit for plants with supplementary retention equipment of gaseous effluents. 
s Discrepant figures are quoted in literature: values of expected activities up to the order of 10 Ci/year are 
also quoted (Ref. 14, 30). 
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00 
Plant 
(net output MWe) 
KWO - Obrigheim 
PWR 
(328) 
KRB - Gundremmingen 
BWR 
(237) 
Mean : 60 mCi/s 
Peak : 600 mCi/s. 
TABLE 4 
Gaseous and liquid radioactive waste disposals from nuclear power plants in Europe 
Gaseous Liquid 
Annual Mixed fission and 
load Noble gases Aerosols Iodine 131 corrosion products Tritium 
Year factor (without tritium) 
(%) released release released release released release released release released release 
limit limit limit limit limit 
/Ci/y/ /Ci/y/ /Ci/y/ /Ci/y/ /Ci/y/ /Ci/y/ /Ci/y/ /Ci/y/ /Ci/y/ /Ci/y/ 
1969 77.9 5,560 80,000 <l.8·10-2 6.3•10-2 15 10.5 18 328 
1970 83.9 7,700 80,000 <l.7·10-2 4.4• 10-2 15 3.24 18 430 
1971 76.9 1,456 7,600 4.4 18 
(new) 
1967 8,800 l.9•1061 9.6 • 10-3 2 850 1. 75 • 10-2 22 
1968 8,800 l.9•1061 4.1 • 10-3 2 850 3.2• 10-2 22 
1969 74.1 11,400 1. 9. 106 1 7.6 · 10-3 2 850 3.6 • 10-1 22 1.65 14.4 17.8 432 
(mean: 
0.68 mCi/s) 
(peak: 
9 mCi/s) 
1970 84.3 7,350 l.9• 1061 7.4·10-2 2 850 2 • 10-1 22 1. 52 14.4 30 432 
1971 90.2 6,650 l.9• 106 1 5 • 10-2 2 850 3.2 • 10-1 22 1. 89 14.4 
-co 
Plant 
(net output MWe) 
KWL - Lingen (Germany) 
BWR 
(174) 
Garigliano - Italy 3 
BWR 
(151. 5) 
I Mean : 100 mCi/s 
Peak : 1 Ci/s. 
Annual 
load 
Year factor 
(%) 
1969 91. 2 
1970 69.3 
1971 67 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
a The release limits are actually being revised. 
TABLE 4 (continuation) 
Gaseous 
Noble gases Aerosols 
released release released release 
limit limit 
/Ci/y/ /Ci/y/ /Ci/y/ /Ci/y/ 
200,000 3.l• 1062 2. 5 • 10-1 15 800 
(peak: 
25 mCi/s) 
132,000 3.l• 1062 6.7 • 10-1 15 800 
(peak: 
30 mCi/s) 
(peak: 
40 mCi/s) 3.l• 1062 15 800 
29,200 3 • 106 -
82,000 3 • 106 
140,000 3 • 106 6.3 • 10-2 3 • 103 
275,000 3 • 106 6.3. 10-2 3 • 103 
640,000 3 • 106 6.3•10-2 3 • 103 
Liquid 
Mixed fission and 
Iodine 131 corrosion products Tritium 
(without tritium) 
released release released release released release 
limit limit limit 
/Ci/y/ /Ci/y/ /Ci/y/ /Ci/y/ /Ci/y/ /Ci/y/ 
- 16 0.64 5.4 26 
2.6 • 10-1 16 0.6 5.4 31. 7 
16 0.3 5.4 
-
3.4 5 • 103 8 5 • 105 
4.8 5 • 103 8 5 • 105 
neg!. 1 · 104 9 5 • 103 7 5 • 105 
6. 10-2 1 • 104 11.9 5 • 103 5 5 • 105 
l.3•10-1 1 • 104 19.1 5 • 103 5 5 • 105 
TABLE 4 (continuation) 
Gaseous Liquid 
Annual Mixed fission and 
Plant load Noble gases Aerosols Iodine 131 corrosion products Tritium 
Year factor (without tritium) 
(net output MWe) 
(%) released release released release released release released release released release 
limit limit limit limit limit 
/Ci/y/ /Ci/y/ /Ci/y/ /Ci/y/ /Ci/y/ /Ci/y/ /Ci/y/ /Ci/y/ /Ci/y/ /Ci/y/ 
Trino Vercellese (Italy) 
PWR 
(247) 1967 59.1 5 • 104 8.97 21 600 5 • 103 
1968 shut down - 5 • 104 5.51 21 - 5 • 103 
1::5 1969 shut down - 5 • 104 3.09 21 - 5 • 103 
1970 65.4 19.2 5 • 104 <1.2· 10-4 0.2 5.9· 10-4 5 • 10-2 2.96 21 135 5 • 103 
1971 68.5 585 5 • 104 <1.4• 10-4 0.2 1 • 10-3 5 • 10-2 19.07 21 1 117 5 • 103 
---
Latina 4 (Italy) 
GCR 
(153) 1967 2,500 5 • 105 neg!. 5 • 102 neg!. 3 · 103 14.2 1.6. 103 2.5 • 105 
1968 2,500 5 • 105 neg!. 5 • 102 neg!. 3 . 103 72 1.6 • 103 398 2.5 • 105 
1969 39.8 1,500 5 • 105 neg!. 5 • 102 neg!. 3 • 103 29 1.6 · 103 25.2 2.5 • 105 
1970 90.1 2,500 5 • 105 neg!. 5 • 102 neg!. 3 • 103 10.2 1.6 • 103 16.7 2.5 • 105 
1971 73 2,470 5 • 105 neg!. 5 • 102 neg!. 3 • 103 1.5 1.6 • 103 13 2.5 · 105 
---
Sena-Chooz (France) 
PWR 
(270) 1970 62.5 3 2.5 • 106 neg!. 103 6.4 100 339 7 • 106 
1971 78.8 4,500 2.5 • 106 neg!. 103 34.4 100 706 7 • 106 
4 The release limits are actually being revised. 
~ 
I-"' 
Plant 
(net output MWe) 
Chinon 
EDFl (70) 
EDF2 (200) 
EDF3 (480) 
St-Laurent-des-Eaux 
SL1 (480) 
SL2 (515) 
Year 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1969 
1970 
1971 
Annual 
load 
factor 
(%) 
68.8; 89.4; 
55.3 
79. 7; 91.1; 
72.7 
41. 5; 57. l; 
79.2 
SLl: 52.1 
SLl: 8.6 
SLl:73.9 
SL2: 77 .2 
TABLE 4 (continuation) 
Gaseous 
Noble gases Aerosols 
released release released release 
limit limit 
/Ci/y/ /Ci/y/ /Ci/y/ /Ci/y/ 
12,300 4 • 105 <10-2 103 
8,085 4 • 105 <I0-2 103 
4,225 4 • 105 1.8. 10-2 103 
1,900 4 • 105 <l 103 
305 4 • 105 <I0-2 103 
3,425 4 • 105 4.7 · 10-2 103 
Liquid 
Mixed fission and 
Iodine 131 corrosion products Tritium 
(without tritium) 
released release released release released release 
limit limit limit 
/Ci/y/ /Ci/y/ /Ci/y/ /Ci/y/ /Ci/y/ /Ci/y/ 
7.44 900 
2.25 900 
2 900 
2.71 800 
0.77 800 
2.25 800 
The ways of exposure to the activity in liquid effluents depend on the utilization of the 
receiving river system for : 
- drinking water; 
- fishery; 
- watering cattle; 
- irrigation; 
recreation (external irradiation). 
From the wide sources of information used here, the (calculated) exposure values due to 
radioactive effluent releases from nuclear power plants can be outlined as follows : 
Dose rate ( mrem/year) 
at site boundary at 5 km 
Noble gases 
PWR < 1 < 0.1 
BWR < 5 < 1 
Aerosols and iodine 
(inhalation) < 0.5 < 0.05 
With regard to the exposure by consumption of milk contaminated with I-131, an 
evaluation being too imprecise to have any practical meaning, it can be noted that iodine-131 
has never been detected in milk produced around any nuclear power plant (detection limit about 
10 pCi/liter, corresponding to a thyroid dose of a small child of about 40 mrem/year). 
Dose rates due to the activity released with liquid effluents are conservatively estimated 
to be less than 1 mrem/year. 
3. Comparison between the exposure of man to radiation originating from nuclear 
power plant operations and that from other sources of radiation 
From section II.A.2. above can be seen that the only normal radioactive effluents 
releases from nuclear power plants which are worthwhile to assess, versus the dose limits for the 
public, are the gaseous effluents and more specifically the noble gases. At present radioactive 
effluents from fuel processing plants play a minor role in the radiation exposure of the 
population. 
To allow a comparison of human exposure to radiation from radioactive effluents released 
by nuclear plants with exposure from other sources of ionizing radiation, table V gives a survey of 
dose-rates to man from various radiation sources as well as the whole body dose limits for the dif-
ferent groups of the population. 
These data lead to the conclusion that the doses to critical population groups in the 
vicinity of nuclear power stations do not exceed 1/100th of the dose limits for such populations 
as fixed by the Euratom standards and correspondingly no more than about 1/20th of the 
radiation dose level from the natural background. 
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TABLE 5 
Comparative table of human exposure to radiation 
(Ref. 9, 25, 26, 30, 58 and others) 
1 . Mean annual dose-rates due to natural background 
In 'normal' areas { 
gonads 
bone-lining cells 
bone-marrow 
Typical example of distribution : 
- cosmic radiation (at sea level) 
- terrestrial radiation (including air) 
- internal irradiation l gonads bone-lining cells bone marrow 
N.B. : This dose-rate varies with the geology and with altitude. 
a) geology: igneous rocks 
b) altitude : 
at 3 OOO m altitude 
transatlantic flight at 10 OOO m 
2. Diagnostic X-ray dose in medicine 
genetically significant dose 
93 mrad/year 
92 mrad/year 
89 mrad/year 
28 mrad/year 
44 mrad/year 
21 mrad/year 
20 mrad/year 
17 mrad/year 
up to 5 OOO mrad/year 
ea. 90 mrad/year 
3-5 mrad/flight 
6-60 mrem/year 1 
3 . Annual exposure due to gaseous effluent releases from nuclear power stations 
a) individuals at the site boundary 
PWR 
BWR 2 
b) average exposure of individuals within a 5 km radius 
PWR 
BWR 
c) average population exposure due to all nuclear power applications 
< 1 mrem/year 
< 5 mrem/year 
< 0. 1 mrem/year 
< 1 mrem/year 
< 1 mrem/year 
4. Maximum permissible doses and dose limits as fixed by the Euratom standards 
(whole body doses) 
persons professionally exposed 
members of the public (critical groups) 
population 'at large' 
(genetically significant dose) 
1 Values for Europe: in the United States presently about 100 mrem/year. 
5 OOO mrem/year 
500 mrem/year 
5 mrem m 30 years (3) 
(170 mrem/year) 
2 For BWR's two calculated highs, respectively of 170 and 31 mrem, have been reported at the site boundary 
(ref. 48). 
3 Other more severe apportionments are recommended or applied : 
ICRP 2 rem in 30 years = 6 mrem/year 
FRG i • USSR I 2 rem m 30 years 
Sweden 1 rem in 30 years 
UK 1 rad in 30 years. 
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4. Application of •practical' discharge standards 
Until recently most discharge limits for radioactive effluents from nuclear power plants 
were so fixed as to ensure that the radiological dose limits to members of the population in the 
environment of the plants were not exceeded. Experience has shown that the actual releases 
in both gaseous and liquid form were always far below these 'radiologically' acceptable limits. 
On the basis of this experience and with the aim of reducing man's exposure to the 
practicable minimum, the authorities on radiation protection in several Member States and in 
other countries have recently recommended or set much more restrictive limits (Ref. 20, 30 and 
others) on discharges from nuclear power stations than those formerly accepted. These are, 
then, 'practical' limits, lower again than the 'radiologically' acceptable limits. In certain cases 
these more restrictive dose values may be exceeded (theoretically up to the ceiling of the radio-
logical values), provided that suitable justification is given and accepted by the licensing 
authorities. 
A few significant practical values can be quoted by way of illustration: 
gaseous effluents: 10 1 - 30 mrem/year 
(rare gases essentially) 
- liquid effluents : 30 mrem/year 
5 Ci/year (excluding tritium) 
Concentration in cooling water before discharge (less tritium) 20 pCi/1 
Concentration of tritium in cooling water before discharge 5 OOO pCi/1 
Such 'as low as practicable' or 'design objective' standards (corresponding to actual 
experience) serve in particular the purpose of long-term caution and provisions. Some of these 
standards are still subject to controversy, in particular the validity of the integrated population 
dose (man-rem) concept advocated by some especially for long-term provisions (e.g. Ref. 49) and 
in fact already applied in recent forecasting studies (e.g. Ref. 50). 
5. Medium- and long-term forecast for the long-lived nuclides Kr85 (10.4 years) and 
H3 (T = 12.4 years) from the nuclear power plants 
5. 1 . Influence of supplementary retention equipment 
First of all, it should be pointed out that such forecasts have to be handled with care, 
amongst others, because of a probable increased use of supplementary retention equipment or 
procedures. 
Several methods are already in use or under development for reducing the discharge of 
radioactive gaseous effluents from power stations (as well as from reprocessing plants), with 
the special aim of temporarily or permanently storing the long-lived Kr85 (10.4 years) and the 
short-lived Xe133 (5.3 days). They include systems such as simple hold-up for Xe133 decay, 
adsorption on active carbon (cooled at near ambiant temperature); supplementary retention 
factor varying from 40 to 2 OOO for BWR), cryogenics (very low temperature concentration 
followed by solid adsorption), or use of fluorocarbonated solvents at low temperature. 
value proposed in the United States, but may be exceeded if suitably justified; 
ii valid for a residential area, and not necessarily at the boundary of the plant site (Ref. 41); 
iii recommended for total body irradiation, gonads and bone marrow (15 mrem for other organs) (Ref. 41); 
iv in practice this would lead to a whole body dose of 5 mrem/year because of shielding from buildings, and 
limited periods of occupancy near site boundary (Ref. 4 7). 
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These rad-waste or 'mini-release' systems can be applied for use in fuel reprocessing plants, 
or they can be adapted for nuclear power plants with variants depending on the volume of the 
effluents to be processed (larger volumes for BWR for instance). For nuclear power plants the 
first aim is to facilitate construction in more densely populated or urban areas. 
As an indicative example a large twin 1 600 MWe (total) BWR station with usual short 
time hold-up equipment, could give rise to several tens of mrem/year individual average total 
body dose due to noble gases at the plant boundary, This would be reduced by a factor 10 by a 
recombiner and charcoal delay system. At this occasion may be mentioned that the same 
would apply for the thyroid dose due to iodine release : several tens of mrems (inhalation and 
injection of milk) would be reduced by the rad-waste system to a few mrem. 
The additional cost of such equipment is estimated to be about 1-3 million u.a. (units 
of account). 
For liquid effluents in general improvements of the presently applied decontamination 
systems can be applied also, at a cost of about 0.5-1 million u.a. 
For tritium there is no practical way to keep it from being released to the environment. 
Total coolant recycling could be applied but build-up of tritium would give rise to a displacement 
of the problem (e.g. containment contamination and purging) with most likely a higher hazard to 
the professionally exposed. 
In general, one can say for all the supplementary retention equipment mentioned here that 
one has to weigh the advantage of reduced releases to the environment versus potential higher 
hazards 'in-plant' or during subsequent transportation and storage of the accumulated wastes. 
5. 2. Future estimated releases of KrB5 and H3 from nuclear power plants 
With the restrictions pointed out in the preceding section 5.1., a rough estimate can easily 
be made up to 1985 for the sake of comparison with the expected curie-release values from 
reprocessing plants (section II.B.). The estimates summarized in table VI below are based on: 
(a) the nuclear power forecast for the Community of Six (Chapter I, Table 1). 
(b) typical BWR and PWR releases quoted under section II.A.2. 1. 
(c) and assuming half the units of the PWR-type and the other half of the BWR-type. 
It should moreover be reminded that the releases for noble gases (see II.A.2.) include 
both Xel33 (T = 5.3 days) and Kr85 (T = 10.4 years) and their short-lived isotopes. 
Depending on the hold-up time either the Xel33 and other short-lived Xe-isotopes or 
the Kr85 and other short-lived Kr-isotopes activity contribution may be determining at the time 
of release. 
For long term evaluations however the short-lived isotopes can be discarded and 
therefore Xel33 and Kr85 become determining. With these assumptions, one can reasonably 
assume for a PWR with a 40-50-day hold-up of the hydrogenated effluents (besides the 
permanently released venting air), Kr85 would constitute about 1/3 to 1/5 (e.g. Ref. 9, 
Chapter III) 2 of the total noble gas activity released. For a BWR, where most of the 
active effluents discharged stem from the gas-ejector at the condenser and from turbine leaks 
with generally a hold-up of not more than 0.5 hours, Kr85 constitutes about a fraction of 
5 · 10-3 of the total activity (e.g. Ref. 22 and 28) and Xel33 the rest (also Ref. 6, Chapter III). 
1 BWR 103 Ci/MWe-year ( 
PWR 10 Ci/MWe-year I noble gases 
B\VR 5. 10-2 Ci/MWe-year I t 't' 
PWR 20 Ci-MWe-year \ n mm 
For calculation purposes the value of l /3 has been retained (Table VJ), i.e. tbc most conservative from the 
point of view of environmental effects. 
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TABLE 6 
Power PWR- BWR- Krs5_ Krss_ Krss_ Ha- Ha- Ha-
power power PWR BWR total PWR BWR total 
Year 
(thousands of M,Ve) (Ci/year) (Ci/ycar) 
1972 5.5 2.7 2.7 104 1.35· 104 2. 35· 104 5.4· 104 135 5.4· 104 
1975 12 6 6 2. 104 3• 104 5 · 104 l.2· 105 300 l.2· 105 
1980 45 22.5 22.5 7.4·104 l.1·105 1.85· 105 4.5· 105 1.13•103 4.5•105 
1985 100 50 50 1. 65 • 105 2.5· 105 4.1•1(}> 106 2.5· 103 106 
There seems to be little point in making further detailed forecasts, as from 1985 onwards 
other types of reactors may contribute in the nuclear power production 1 and hold-up, and com-
plementary retention equipment may be more developed and applied in all types of reactors 
than is presently the case. 
Just in order to obtain a further indication - on a 'conservative basis' - of the power 
plant versus the reprocessing plant problem, using the same (LWR) assumptions, in the year 2000 
could be expected 2.55 · 106 Ci/year of Kr85 and about 6.2 · 106 Ci/year of H3. 
The estimates will be compared with those for releases of Kr85 and H3 from fuel 
processing plants (see next section II.B.). 
B - THE RADIOACTIVE GASEOUS AND LIQUID EFFLUENTS PRODUCED IN 
ROUTINE OPERATION OF FUEL PROCESSING PLANTS - MEDIUM AND 
LONG RANGE ESTIMATES 
A considerable quantity of radioactive material is produced during the operation of power 
reactors. Most of this material produced in the fuel elements are retained within them until 
they are reprocessed. 
Reprocessing is the operation in the fuel cycle in which the largest quantity of radio-
activity is dealt with. This operation is therefore also the source of most of the radioactive 
waste of different kinds. 
1. Radioactive waste resulting from the reprocessing of irradiated fuel 
Classes and types of waste 
Reprocessing consists in separating the fissile materials from the products contained 
within the irradiated fuel and in purifying the recovered materials. 
As will be seen also in section II.C. e.g. LMFBR's can be operated with less radioactive gaseous effluents 
than LWR. 
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At present, the main process used on the industrial scale is aqueous reprocessing. All 
the operations involved in reprocessing result in the production of different types of radio-
active waste. The first class includes the pieces of fuel cladding forming the solid radioactive 
waste produced by decanning operations. The gaseous fission products contained within the 
fuel elements, such as Kr85, Xel33, !131 and H3, are liberated during sectioning and dissolving; 
they constitute the gaseous radioactive waste class. 
Most of the radioactivity is contained in the non-volatile fission products present 
together with the fissile material in the dissolver solution. After the fissile materials have been 
extracted, this solution contains the fission products and forms the class of highly active waste. 
The entrailment of certain fission products require the final purification of the fissile 
material and the cleaning of the solvent before it is reused. These operations produce solutions 
of radioactive waste in sometimes very large quantities, although its specific radioactivity is very 
much lower than that of high-activity solutions. It is sometimes necessary, for plant 
maintenance purposes, to decontaminate parts of the installation or certain items of equipment. 
This decontamination process produces also considerable quantities of medium and low-
activity radioactive waste. 
2. Dischar~e of radioactive effluents into the environment 
Since a reprocessing plant is the point at which a large part of the radioactive waste 
produced during the irradiation of fuels in nuclear power stations is accumulated, it is also 
the main industrial 'unit' point of discharge in the whole of the fuel cycle operations (fuel 
fabrication, power plants, enrichment, reprocessing). 
Two types of waste are discharged into the environment by reprocessing plants : gaseous 
and liquid waste. The maximum discharge rates for both these effluents are also based on 'radio-
logical' protection standards such as those of European Atomic Energy Community and the 
recommendations of the ICRP (International Commission for Radiation Protection). Starting 
from the principle of the limitation of exposure doses to the levels considered permissible (basic 
standards) and an analysis of the critical pathways, maximum permissible concentrations 
(derived standards) in water and in the atmosphere have also been laid down for each radio-
active nuclide. The discharge limits for a reprocessing installation concerned are prescribed on 
the basis of these basic and derived standards, bearing in mind a minimum dilution factor for the 
discharge point in question. 
2. 1 . Gaseous waste 
In the present state of the art, the gaseous waste from reprocessing installations is mainly 
made up of the noble gases Kr85, Xel33 and part of the H3 contained in the fuel. Fuel cooled 
for 150 days contains only a small quantity of Xel33 1 as a result of the decay of this isotope. 
pa1 (T = 8.1 days) is largely eliminated by decay during the cooling of the fuel and by specific 
'off-gas' treatments to retain the iodine. 
The gaseous discharge is thus essentially limited to the following radioactive products : 
all the Kr85 produced during irradiation, the (small) fractions of Xel33 still present at the time of 
reprocessing, the quantity of H3 released in gas form 2, a very small proportion of !131 which 
escapes the retention treatment, and a very small fraction of the aerosols or solid particles. 
1 May be different for Pu-fuel (see section II.C). 
The largest fraction of H 3 is released in the liquid eifluents (about 90 %). 
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2 2. Liquid waste 
The liquid radioactive wastes discharged by a reprocessing plant consists of liquids 
which have been subjected to decontamination treatments and which therefore contain only very 
small quantities of radioactive nuclides. 
The decontamination treatments used retain almost all the fission and activation products 
with the exception of tritium, which is mainly found in the treated liquids in the form of tritiated 
water and is thus finally discharged into the environment, either into a river or into the sea. The 
radioactivity level of the liquids discharged by reprocessing plants is limited in a similar way to 
that used for gaseous radioactive waste. The limits on low-activity waste depend on the dilution 
achieved at the point of discharge and the specific use of the body of water into which the liquid 
is discharged. 
3. Forecasts for the discharge of radioactive effluents 
A natural consequence of the increasing use of nuclear energy will be an increase in the 
quantities of radioactive waste from plants reprocessing irradiated fuel. 
The quantities of nuclides for which no retention treatment is currently employed in 
reprocessing plants, particularly Kr85 and H3, will therefore increase in proportion to the installed 
nuclear power. 
Year 
1975 
1980 
1982 
1985 
(2000 
TABLE 71 
Quantities of Kr85 and ff3 produced in relation to the 
quantities of fuel to be reprocessed (from LWR) 
Fuel to be reprocessed Krss 
tons/year Ci/year 
110 1 106 
720 7 106 
1 200 1 107 
1 940 1.7 107 
9 OOO 8 107 
I Chapter!, Ref. (I). 
H3 
Ci/year 
8 104 
5 105 
8 105 
1.4 106 
6 106) 2 
Quantity influenced largely by proportion of LWl{ uranium fuel and l'u-fucl (Recycle and FBR). 
It may be pointed out that the discharge of H3 in gaseous form by reprocessing plants 
represents only a fraction (max. 10%) of the total quantity of H3 in the fuel. Most of the ff3 
appears in liquid form (tritiated water) and is discharged with low-radioactivity liquids. The 
maximum permissible concentrations of Kr85 and H3 in the atmosphere are of the same order 
of magnitude; it may thus be concluded that the discharge of about 10% of H3 in gaseous form 
will not present any problems for relatively small capacity reprocessing plants (1 t/day). 
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C - LONG-RANGE EXPOSURE EFFECTS ON MANKIND - MEDIUM AND 
LONG-RANGE FORECASTS FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS AND 
REPROCESSING PLANT GROWTH 
1. Conservative nature of the estimates 
In the long range effects estimates for the potential exposure from nuclear power plant 
development to the population (general public), a conservative approach is mostly taken by 
assuming up to the year 1990 or 2000 no significant contribution from advanced type reactors 
(especially LMFBR). This is justified by the fact that these reactors can operate with lower 
routine effluents than 'current' LWR's and by the uncertainties in the future extent of their 
power generation application (Ref. 50). 
On the other hand for the long-range effects of fuel reprocessing operation Plutonium 
thermal fuel (Plutonium recycle) and Plutonium Fast Breeder Reactor (FBR) fuel may become 
significant around 1990-2000. The decay time before processing operation starts may be short 
for FER-fuel (about 30 days 1 (because of economies in the Pu-cycle and this leads to a 
significantly higher amount of radioactivity at the time of reprocessing (especially for the 
meaningful relatively short lived isotopes XeI33, Jl31). This would in tum lead to about 3 times 
higher doses for the whole body (noble gases, due to Xel33) and for the Thyroid (!131) in 
comparison with LWR-fuel processing presuming present day technology now applied. 
In other words FBR development is - from the standpoint of routine environmental implica-
tions-advantageous at the power production stage and disadvantageous at the fuel-processing 
stage, i.e. as compared to LWR's. 
As has been pointed out in a recent detailed national and world wide estimate study 
of ionizing radiation up to the year 2000 (Ref. 50), the estimates do generally not include further 
development of hold-up and retention techniques. 
Therefore the results one arrives at are further enhanced in their conservative nature. 
2. Results 
2 .1. Kr85 and H3 
From the tables 6 and 7 in the previous sections can be deduced that as far as the 'global' 
releases of the Kr85 to the atmosphere are concerned the reprocessing operations are 
determining, and this by a factor 100 over nuclear power plants whilst the Tritium releases are 
practically equal for both types of nuclear installations. The same would apply on a world-wide 
basis (Ref. 37, 38, 50). 
2.2. Global effects of KrB5 
On the basis of the world-wide energy forecasts, and assuming that Kr85 is continuously 
released and accumulated in the atmosphere without any complementary retention equipment 
whatsoever, its permanent average annual contribution to the individual total body dose of the 
public could in the year 2000 at most be about 5 · 10-2 mrem 2 (corresponding to an accumulated 
3 150 · 106 Ci 3), about 1.15 mrem 2 by 2050 (Ref. 27, 38, 52). As already mentioned earlier 
about 99 % of this would result from the reprocessing operations. With respect to the 'global' 
effects, the increase of Kr85 in the environment from the use of nuclear energy in the world 
1 As compared to 150 days for L\VR-fuel. 
2 Whole body dose and gonads; for 0.15 mrem this corresponds to about 7 mrem 'body surface' or 'skin' dose. 
a 1000 . 106 Ci in 1990. 
29 
would up 
compared 
instance). 
to the end of the 21st century not give rise to a significant radiation hazard 
to natural background differences from region to region and with height, 
Some regional global accumulation of Kr85 might however occur (Ref. 43). 
(as 
for 
It is most likely however that nevertheless by that time retention equipment will be 
installed but mainly for 'local' requirements as outlined below. 
2.3. Global effects of Tritium 
The cosmic 1 Tritium equilibrium is of the order of 100 · 106 curies (presently the natural 
background of Tritium is about a factor 10 higher because of residual Tritium from Weapons 
tests fall-out). By the turn of the century, the Tritium accumulated by the nuclear power 
generation in the world would also reach 100 million curies, which is about 6% of amount which 
was present in 1963 (due to weapon tests). After the year 2000, Tritium production from 
nuclear power would become the main source of Tritium in bio- and troposphere unless retention 
means were developed. Presently the estimated individual dose to a member of the public is 
about 0.04 to 0.06 mrem/year, in the high range due mainly to residual Tritium from weapon 
tests. By the year 2000 this average dose would only be about 0.02 to 0.03 mrem/year (Ref. 
28, 50). It can be considered that on a 'global' basis Tritium presents even less of a hazard than 
Kr85. 
2.4. Local effects of Kr85-release (and Xel33_releases) 
Rather than the 'global' effects it is the local consequences of Kr85 releases near large 
capacity (5-10 tons/day) reprocessing plants which may require caution (Kr85 releases of more 
than 107 Ci/year). Besides the trend in operating reprocessing plants of larger capacity, also a 
gradual increase in the burn-up of the fuel to be processed increases the needs of Kr85 releases. 
Furthermore for Pu-fuel processing the Xe133 contribution may become determining (see sec-
tion II. C. 1). A reprocessing plant of 5-10 ton/day capacity would give rise to a whole body 
noble gas dose of the order of hundreds of mrem in the near vicinity of the plant and of several or 
tens of mrem at 3 000 m (based on Ref. 50) distance (depending on the type of fuel treated; with 
Xe133 determining for FER-fuel). 
For exemple (Ref. 39), if all the fuel expected to be available for reprocessing in West 
Germany during the year 1990 were reprocessed in a single plant, an annual individual total body 
dose in the vicinity of over 100 mrem could be attained (i.e. still below a 'radiological' limit value 
of 500 mrem but in excess of the recommended 'practical values' of e.g. 30 mrem/year for nuclear 
power plants in the Federal Republic of Germany). This would imply that if the stringent, 
'practical standards' for nuclear power plants (for gaseous effluents) were applied also to reprocess-
ing plants assuming that no complementary retention equipment were used, about one reprocessing 
plant would have to be available for every ten nuclear power stations (Ref. 40). 
It should be borne in mind that a 'park' (multi-unit site) of several (e.g. 10) nuclear power 
plants could give rise to equivalent local problems, essentially because of the 'total' noble gas 
releases (the relatively short-lived Xe133 and Kr85, with the main contribution from Xe133 how-
ever in this case). For BWR such problems could be more severe than for reprocessing plants, 
if no supplementary hold-up or retention equipment were provided, as demonstrated easily by 
comparing for instance Tables 4 and 7 (e.g. ten current BWR's are about equivalent to one 5 ton/ 
day reprocessing plant from the point of view of noble gas release). For instance a twin BWR 
plant of the order of 1 600 MWe may give rise to several tens 2 of mrem/year average individual 
total body dose due to noble gases. However with improved rad-waste systems this can be reduced 
to a few mrem/year (see also section II. A. 5. 1). 
1 4 · 106 to 8 • 106 annual production (Ref. 36). 
2 But less if spread out over cumulative population around the plant (derived from integrated man-rem). 
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These long-term considerations will probably also determine the development and appli-
cation of supplementary retention equipment for rare gases in nuclear power and reprocessing 
plants (Ref. 51). This does however lead to the problem of transporting and disposing of the 
accumulated bottled Kr85 (e.g. in 50 1. cylinders). 
2.5. Local effects of Tritium release 
In the long term, the main aspect of the Tritium hazard is also 'local' receptivity for both 
high capacity reprocessing plants (5-10 ton/day) and to a lesser extent multi-unit siting of nuclear 
power plants (especially of the PWR-type). For example a 1 OOO tons/year reprocessing plant 
(200 days load factor at 5 ton/day) would discharge about 7 · 5 · 105 Ci of Tritium in the liquid 
effluents, whilst ten 1 OOO MWe PWR units would discharge about 2 · 105 Ci of Tritium. From 
section 11.A.2. can be deduced that exposure rates could become significant 1 in the near 
vicinity of such installations, if no large dilution capacity were available such as fast-flowing 
rivers or the sea. It may be however that in the future a practical technology be developed for 
removing Tritium from liquid effluents (see also section 11.A.2.). Moreover it may be that the 
fraction of Tritium released with the gaseous effluents (10% to 20%) becomes determining in a 
reprocessing plant. Indeed estimates indicate (Ref. 50) that for a plant, treating about 5-10 ton/ 
day, the whole body dose (mainly due to inhalation from plume p~ssage) would still be of the order 
of tens of mrem/year 2 at 3 OOO m distance from the plant. 
It seems therefore that on a long-term basis due to 'local' considerations only, reprocessing 
plants will become determining in the Tritium hazard. 
3. Overall exposure contribution of nuclear power generation development 
If one looks at the present and future potential contribution of nuclear energy development 
in the total radiation burden to mankind a clear illustration is given of its 'healthy' situation in 
routine operations. 
Various estimates indicate for instance for a highly developed country (e.g. USA) the 
trend in exposure for an average individual of the population at large. They are summarized 
in Table 8. 
It can be seen that at present the whole field of nuclear energy (including power production, 
fuel cycle industry, research) would contribute for less (see also Table 5) than 1 mrem/person 
mean annual whole body exposure (which is genetically significant), a value which is in Europe 
probably also not reached (Ref. 8, 9). Only 1/10 of this value from exposure to the general public 
and at the turn of the century - assuming conservatively no retention equipment improvements 
by that time - the average individual fraction given to the general public may grow to about 
the same order of magnitude of that by the occupational contribution, due to population and 
nuclear industry growth. The total average individual dose would then be somewhat larger 
than 1 mrem/person-year. These figures can be compared with the 'most conservative' radio-
logical allowances made for the genetically significant doses, e.g. 1 mrem/30 year equals 
34 mrem/year (Ref. 49) a. 
1 By significant is meant : overriding the l. 5 mremjyear apportionment for Tritium of which O. 5 mrem/year 
via drinking water and 1 mrem/year through inhalation and consumer goods (i.e. for the public). 
2 According to Ref. (50), about 5 mrem/year for a 300 t/year plant at 3,000 m distance; according to Ref. (51) 
a ten times smaller dose is found (about 3.5 mrem/year for a 1 600 t/year plant, no distance specified). Any-
how the apportionment for Tritium to be inhaled (1 mrem,/year) would be overridden in both cases. 
a Proposed apportionment of O. 5 rem/30 years to nuclear power generation plants and O. 5 rem/year to 
transportation, reprocessing and waste disposal. 
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TABLE 8 
Estimated average Whole-body Radiation (mrem/person-year) 
from various sources 
1970 2000 
Natural background 110 110 
Medical 90 100 
Global fall-out 1 (Weapons) 5 5 
Miscellaneous 2 3 1 
Occupational 3 0.8 0.8 
Other environmental (nuclear energy production 
and associated industry) 0.07 0.6 
1 After a peak of about l2 mrcm in 1!)63. 
2 1vliscellaneous: Television, air transport, consumer goods. 
3 \Vith the main contribution so far from practice of medicine and dentistry (Ref. 50). 
D - INDICATIVE COMPARISON BETWEEN IMPORTANCE OF NUCLEAR 
EFFLUENTS AND EFFLUENTS FROM CONVENTIONAL INDUSTRY AND 
CONSUMPTION GOODS 
1. General 
A detailed companson between nuclear and conventional activities has not been 
performed here. Only some indicative examples are given in order to obtain - further to the more 
detailed data on nuclear activities dealt with in other sections of the present report - a crude 
idea of the relative hazards to mankind. 
Emphasis is placed here on 'gaseous' effluents comparison, because it was seen earlier that 
on a short, medium and long-term basis these effects are-for the nuclear industry (from the 
standpoint of radioactivity)-overriding the importance of liquid (radioactive) effluents 
discharge. In later sections a similar indicative comparison will be made on waste 'storage' 
and accumulation and on thermal effects which, for the nuclear industry is more of a routine operation 
problem than the liquid 'radioactive' effluents discharges to the environment. 
2. Comparative examples 
In the case of gaseous effluents from nuclear power plants, the contaminants discharged 
give the following comparative figures in relation to waste from conventional power stations 
(Ref. 11). 
The fact that, in the nuclear case the volume of air required to dilute the quantity of 
effluents released in order to respect the permissible (radiation) standards is much smaller than 
the volume needed for conventional coal and oil-fired stations (Refs. 27 and 28) in order to 
respect the standards for conventional pollutants, also gives an indication of the cleanliness of 
nuclear power stations in comparison with other power sources. Other data from industrialized 
countries give an idea of the present and likely long-term situations as regards pollution. 
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TABLE 9 
(partly taken from Ref. 11) 
For a 1 OOO MWe power station 
Annual waste discharge (in millions of pounds) 
Pollutant 
Sulfurous oxides 1 
Nitrogen oxides 
Carbon monoxide 
Hydrocarbons 
Aldehydes 
Fly ash 
(retention 97.5%) 
Radioisotopes/half-life 
Radium-226/1 620 years 
Radium-228/5. 7 years 
Krypton-85/10.4 years 
Xenon-133/5. 3 days 
Iodine-131/8.1 days 
1 Typical values for sulphur content in U.S. fuels. 
2 Only fly-ash control. 
3 \Vithout pollution control equipment. 
coal 2 
306 
46 
1.15 
0.46 
0.12 
9.9 
0.017 
0.011 
0 
0 
0 
fuel oil 3 gas 3 nuclear 
116 0.03 0 
48 27 0 
0.02 - 0 
1.47 - 0 
0.26 0.07 0 
1.6 1.0 0 
Annual discharge (curies) 
0.00015 - 0 
0.00035 - 0 
0 n 103 PWR 0 106 BWR 0 0 PWR 
0.5 BWR 
In the USA, all the atmospheric pollutants from all conventional sources amount at 
present to about 125 million tons per year, 12.5% of which are due to electric power (mostly 
oxides of sulphur). They are alleged to cause 20 OOO deaths a year (Ref. 34); this means that 
the individual's risk of death from this cause are about 10-4 a year (cfr. Chapter VI), which is of 
the same order as the risk from all types of accident. 
In an urban area, 60% by weight of the pollutants are at present emitted by motor 
vehicles. 
The annual rate of pollutant discharge in West Germany is reported to be 1.5 x 106 tons 
of oxides of sulphur and some 450 x 106 tons of C02 (excluding the C02 emitted by motor 
vehicles). On the world scale, it is estimated that a total of 1.3 x 1010 tons of C02 are at 
present discharged annually, which is to be compared with the 1012 tons of natural origin 
(Ref. 45). 
There seem to be two contradictory theories on the effects of the accumulation of C02 
(see also Chapter IV) in the long term. One theory states that, by the year 2000, the exchange 
of heat between the earth and the atmosphere will have dropped, causing the temperature of our 
33 
planet to increase by 2-4 oc. According to the other theory, the solar radiation will at the same 
time be absorbed by the C02 enriched atmosphere to such an extent that the temperature of the 
planet will drop. 
Such examples of estimated effects may be compared with nuclear long-term effects, for 
example, calculated for the possible accumulation of Kr85 and Tritium (see Section II.C.2.1. and 2), 
the foreseeable consequences of which would, in the year 2000, be far from truly worrying on a 
universal (or global) basis, even assuming that no special retention measures were taken. 
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CHAPTER III 
Radioactive waste storage and accumulation - ore processing wastes 
A - ORIGIN OF INDUSTRIAL RADIOACTIVE WASTES 
The main wastes to be considered stem from nuclear power production plants. 
1. Power production plants 
Because of the utmost precautions taken in order to maintain exposure to the professionally 
exposed within the fixed standards and to the population as low as practicable, purification and 
decontamination of the various effluent streams is applied (ion-exchange, filtres, etc.). This 
leads to medium-level wastes under solid form which are temporarily stored at the plant sites. 
Moreover special types of wastes originate at those plants, such as radioactive pieces of 
equipment (e.g. pressure vessel internals) which have to be handled on an ad hoe basis. 
2. Fuel reprocessing 
Most of the wastes (from the activity standpoint, not necessarily from the volume stand-
point) stem from the reprocessing operations. 
They result 
(a) from the fuel decladding type: compacted cladding is stored at the reprocessing plant site; 
(b) from the extraction and purification operations. These wastes are treated in order to 
concentrate and store them. 
(i) The highly active liquid wastes (activity level > 104 Ci/m3) are concentrated so as to occupy 
the minimum volume compatible with their temporary storage in liquid form, pending 
ultimate treatment and storage in solid form. Temporary storage in liquid form for three 
to five years will always be economically justified by the decrease in fission products with a 
medium half-life. This decrease consists in a reduction in the heat released which, in turn, 
allows the volume to be more reduced, on final treatment. The processes for ultimate 
disposal under development are e.g. various calcination methods and vitrification. 
(ii) The liquid wastes of medium (level 10-2 to 104 Ci/m3) and low (level < 10-2 Ci/m3) activity 
produced in the plant are usually of widely differing types. The concentration processes to 
which they are subjected are selected in relation to the chemical composition of the solutions 
and their activity. The most usual methods are evaporation, ion exchange and ch~ical 
coprecipitation. The radioactivity is thus during these processes concentrated in the 
evaporation concentrates, the ion exchanges, or the precipitates, according to the treatment 
used. The residual solution comes into a lower-activity class and, as the case may be, can 
be discharged into the environment if its activity is low enough, or must be subjected to further 
treatment before discharge, if its activity is still above permissible levels. The concentrates 
produced by these treatments come into a higher-activity class and are then dealt with 
like other waste in this class, or are temporarily stored pending solidification. 
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The solid or nearly solid waste produced by the treatment of liquid waste of low- or 
medium-activity must later be further processed to facilitate handling and final storage or 
dumping. The processing systems most often used for this class are incorporation in bitumen or 
concrete. 
B - STORAGE, ACCUMULATION AND ULTIMATE DISPOSAL OF RADIO-
ACTIVE WASTES FROM FUEL REPROCESSING AND NUCLEAR POWER 
PLANT OPERATION - MEDIUM AND LONG TERM FORECASTS 
1. Reprocessing wastes 
The radioactive waste resulting from reprocessing of fuel is temporarily stored at the 
reprocessing plant in liquid form pending its ultimate treatment and disposal in places where 
dispersion into the environment can be excluded. The presence amongst the fission products 
of long-lived nuclides and the presence of long-lived alpha emitters imply that the manner in 
which these products are stored and finally disposed of should ensure that dispersion in the 
environment is prevented for extremely long periods. 
More than 95% of the volume of the wastes to be stored are in the form of high and 
medium-activity liquids. From the safety point of view, their temporary storage in well protected 
stainless steel tanks presents no special problem. The drawback of this method is that, 
because of corrosion, the tanks have to be replaced after a number (several decades) of years' 
use. The importance of the investment required and the need for spares to cope with 
possible accidental leakage makes this type of storage only a temporary solution. 
Investigations are therefore being conducted into various ways of dispositing and 
disposing of these wastes for long periods in solid form, which combines the advantages of 
smaller volume and a limited risk of dispersion. The earlier mentioned methods of solidifying 
solutions of high and medium-activity waste are currently being studied on a pilot scale. The 
choice of the solidified product and how it is to be enclosed depend on the depository require-
ments and on the medium in which it is to be ultimately disposed of. 
Final disposal should provide a guarantee that the radioactive products will not be 
dispersed into the biosphere. The investigation and analysis of potential sites meeting this 
requirement must be encouraged at Community level so that all the countries of the Com-
munity will have the necessary facilities ready during the next decades. 
It may be pointed out (Ref. 4) that on a long term basis not only the high-level fission 
products constitute in wastes a problem, but also the foreseeable growing accumulation of 
transuranium elements, such as Plutonium, with long half lives and high toxicity. It has 
e.g. been estimated that by the turn of the century between 400 to 600 t Pu per year will be 
produced. Assuming the presently allowed loss of 1.5% in the waste solutions this would lead 
to a yearly accumulation of 6 to 8 tons of Pu. 
One of the most promising methods at present under consideration for finally storing 
waste (especially high-level waste) consists in depositing it in salt deposits, which are 
attractive because of their lack of contact with water-bearing strata and their good heat 
condJ,ctivity. 
It has been estimated that in the world by the year 2000 between 400 and 600 x 109 curie 
of high level fission product wastes will have accumulated, of which about 1/10 will be due to 
Sr 90 and Cs 137. 
With existing methods under development, it can be forecast that, in the long term, about 
77 sq.km of salt deposits would be necessary throughout the world every year for the storage of 
these wastes, the world's reserves of salt deposits being of the order of tens of millions of sq.km 
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(Ref. 1). Therefore the serious problem of these industrial wastes does not seem to be 
prohibitive. 
Table 10 below gives an estimate of the annual production of different classes of wastes, 
related to the quantities of fuel to be reprocessed, on the basis of the Target nuclear programme for 
the years 1975, 1980, 1985 (and tentatively 2000) for the Community of Six. For the Com-
munity of 9 countries these figures should - on the basis of the forecasts outlined in 
Chapter I be multiplied by a factor 1.5. 
TABLE 101 
Wastes produced by fuel processing (from LWR's) 
Unprocessed wastes 
Fuel to be Decladding 
reprocessed waste High level wastes Medium level Year (fission products) (concentrates) 
t/year m3/year 3 m3/year Ci2 m3/year 
1975 110 11 110 0. 7 · 109 204 
1980 717 72 720 4.4 · 109 1 080 
1985 1 940 195 1 940 12.0·109 2 915 
(2000 9 OOO 900 9 OOO 56. 0 · 109 16 OOO) 2 
Tons m3 m3 Ci m3 
Accumulated 
quantities 9 300 930 9 300 57. 0 · 109 14 OOO 
1975-1985 
Cfr. assumptions Table VII, Section II.B. 
The activity is expressed at the time of reprocessing for fuel cooled for 150 days; as already mentioned earlier 
(e.g. section II.B) Pu-fuel may be subjected to smaller cooling times and this may become important from 
1985 onwards. 
Assuming mechanical or chop or leach ,lccladding. 
The level of annual waste production is fairly low up to 1985. The cumulative volumes 
in the period 1975-1985 on the other hand, represent a considerable amount in both volume and 
activity. The decladding wastes are of fairly small volume in comparison with all the total 
waste volume. Moreover, because it consists of metal, its storage presents fewer problems. 
2. Nuclear power plants wastes 
2 .1. The solid or semi-solid low- or medium-activity wastes resulting from the operation of these 
plants vary with the reactor type. Below some summarizing data are furnished for 
LWR's, gas-cooled reactors and LMFBR's. 
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(1) Light-water reactors 
For LWR's the volumes of solid or semi-solid waste, after dewatering but 'before' 
treatment and packaging, have been reported (Ref. 5) to be as follows : 
Vol. (m3/year) Activity (Ci/m3) 
for a BWR 
spent resins 5. 6-11. 2 < 7 
sludges (condensate) 
clean-up filter (clean-up-systems) 22-64 from 3.5 to 70 
for a PWR 
spent resins 4.8-7 175-3 500 
evaporator bottoms 1.4-4. 2 < 35 
It should be noted that the specific activity data are representative of plants of different 
sizes with varying process sytems, hence they are not additive for a particular reactor 
(also Ref. 5). 
After on-site decay-storage, the BWR resins would generally be packaged in drums (about 
55 gallon-drums in the US) and in ether types of packages (usually large casks for the low-level 
miscellaneous dry wastes. 
As an exemple for a typical two-unit BWR-station (total about 1 600 BWe) (Ref. 6) 
840 drums/year of demineraliser resins fixed in concrete, and 280 m3 of other packaged miscel-
laneous low-level waste have been estimated. This leads to a total yearly volume of 455 m3 to 
be transported to a central despository (or burial ground). This would correspond to about 45 
truck-loads (Ref. 6). 
For P\VR reactors, after on-site storage and decay, the resins and evaporation concen-
trates would generally be packed in drums (30 or 55 gallon-drums in the US). 
As an example for a typical two-unit PWR station (total about 1 600 MWe) (Ref. 9), 
about 300-600 drums are expected. This corresponds to a yearly maximum volume of about 120m3 
to be transported to a central despository (burial ground). This amounts to about 12 shipments. 
(2) Gas-cooled reactors and Fast breeders 
These volumes may be compared with those expected for advanced types of gas-cooled 
reactors. For example for the Fort St. Vrainplant (330 MWe) a yearly solid waste volume 
production of only 11 m3 is expected (approximately 1 shipment) (Ref. 7). The same order of 
magnitude of volume can be noted at the presently operating G.C.R.'s (eg. Ref. 5, Chapter II). 
For the fast breeder reactors of the liquid metal type (e.g. a 300-500 MWe plant, Ref. 8) 
between 14 to 28 m3 of 'packaged' (drums) solid wastes per year are expected. This amounts to 
about 2 shipments. 
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2.2. Relative importance of medium-level reprocessing wastes and power reactor wastes -- accumu-
lation of the wastes: 
From the information under section 2.1 above can be deduced the following approximate 
volumes for medium- and low-level packaged wastes from LWR's : 
455 m3/year 
for a BWR : = 0.28 m3/MWe-year 
1600 MWe 
120 m3/year 
for a PWR : = 0.07 m3/MWe-year 
1600 MWe 
For the nuclear power forecasts outlined in Chapter 1 yearly produced quantities and accu-
mulated quantities can be deduced. It will suffice here to indicate that for instance in 1985 
the yearly production would be (for 100 OOO MWe installed; assuming half by BWR's and half by 
PWR's): 
- BWR: 50 · 103 MWe x 0.28 m3/MWe = 14 · 103 m3 
- PWR : 50 · 103 MWe x 0.07 m3/MWe = 3.5 · 103 m3 
total 17 .5 · 103 m3 
By rough comparison with the medium-level waste volumes produced by corresponding 
fuel reprocessing operations, the total accumulated wastes for the decade 1975-1985 can be quickly 
estimated. A 5-10 t/day reprocessing plant (or about 1 500 t/year) would produce about 2,100 
m3/year of medium-level concentrates (unprocessed and unpackaged) (see Table 10, column 5). 
Processed and packaged this may correspond to about 4 OOO m3/year. Such a reprocessing plant 
could serve about 45 OOO MWe, or 46 nuclear power units of the LWR type. These nuclear power 
units would produce yearly (assuming half BWR and half PWR) about 7,800 m3 of low- and 
medium-level wastes (processed and packaged). Grossly the nuclear power production opera-
tions (under these hypotheses) lead thus to about twice the 'processed' waste volume originated 
by the reprocessing operations. 
The quantity of low- and medium-level wastes from both nuclear power plants and repro-
cessing operations accumulated between 1975 and 1985 in the Community of 9 would therefore 
amount to the maximum of about 1.25 · 105 m3 1, or about one-tenth of a hectometer. Assuming 
most of these wastes would be packed in drums, this represents about 600 OOO drums (2). 
It is considered that per drum a depository 'surface' area of 0.57 m2 or 5.7 · 10-7 km2 is 
necessary. 3 
Hence the total area needed for this accumulated waste of 600 OOO drums, would be 
about 0.34 km2, i.e. about one third of km2. 
In conclusion, the problem of the cumulation, packaging, transport and ultimate disposal 
of these wastes is not negligible, but it is not more serious than the equivalent problems of con-
ventional industrial wastes of a hazardous nature (e.g. cyanides). 
1 14 OOO m3 (table 10, column 5) x 2 (packaging factor) x (2 + 1) x 1./i = 1.25 . 105 m3• 
2 55 gallon, or 0.21 m3 drums. 
3 i.e. about 40 m 2 for 70 drums. 
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C - MISCELLANEOUS: LONG-TERM INDUSTRIAL WASTE FORECASTS FOR 
OTHER NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE OPERATIONS 
The present chapter essentially deals with these wastes from nuclear industry which may 
constitute a medium or long term problem. These are covered in the preceding sections. 
To illustrate that at the other side of the fuel cycle (uranium mining) the problem is far 
from preoccupying, the following estimate may be quoted (Ref. 3). On the basis of the power 
production forecasts during the coming century and assuming coal would be its principle source, 
several million Cu km of mine slag would be produced. The volume of coal in relation to that of 
uranium ore needed for the generation of the same amount of power is in a ratio of the order of 
103-104 as compared to uranium-rich ores and 102 compared to ore poor in uranium. In addition, 
the slag resulting from the operation of coal mines is 102-103 times as large in volume as that 
from uranium mines. This leads to a total volumetric ratio of coal mining wastes of 105-106 
over uranium wastes. 
The magnitude of uranium ore processing waste volumes would therefore be of the order 
of cu kms only. 
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CHAPTER IV 
Thermal waste from nuclear power production 
1. General 
This chapter contains a synthesis of the data and considerations relating to the thermal 
effects on the environment resulting from the operation of nuclear power stations and their 
relationship to other sources of thermal effects. 
Most thermal power plants whether conventional (fossil-fuelled) or nuclear, use a source 
of cold water, such as the sea, a river or a lake, to dissipate a considerable proportion of the heat 
generated which, for fundamental thermodynamic reasons, cannot be transformed into electrical 
energy. 
Over the past few years, the effects of the increase in the temperature of the waters close 
to these power plants have been the subject of many studies and research programmes. The large 
quantity of literature on the subject shows in particular that these effects are still little known, 
but also that directly harmful phenomena have not so far been identified. Nevertheless, certain 
problems connected with the release of waste calories are now often referred to as 'thermal pollu-
tion' because the foreseeable increase in the future needs for electrical energy in the industrialized 
countries makes it possible to predict that irreversible damage would be done to the environment 
in the next few decades if precautions were not taken. 
These preoccupations are based on two main factors, namely: 
(1) Relatively slight temperature rise can have a considerable effect on the natural balance of the 
ecological system of the river, lake, etc., into which the heat is dissipated. The resultant changes 
generally constitute an impoverishment as soon as certain temperature limits - which are 
often crudely defined- are exceeded. 
(2) In the extreme case, a considerable increase in the quantity of heat released into the rivers 
and inland waters would heat up at least some of them to the point at which their fauna or 
flora were in danger. 
2. Main general factors involved in the problems 
(i) In a fossil-fuelled power plant, 38% of the heat energy is converted into useful electrical 
energy, while 53% must be evacuated by the cooling water and 9% is dissipated through the 
stack. 
(ii) In a water-cooled plant, about 32% (31 to 33%) of the heat is converted into electricity, 
while 68% must be dissipated into the aqueous heat sink (river, lake, sea). 
(iii) In HTGCR power plants, the efficiency may reach about 45% so that 55% has to be rejected 
in the aqueous heat sink. 
(iv) In breader reactors, the efficiency is about 40%, with 60% to be rejected. 
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(v) The condensator-ratio 'loss/useful' power is thus: 
for a fossil-fuelled plant = 1.4 (1.6. total ratio) 
for a LWR-plant = 2.1 
for a HTGR-plant 1.2 
for a breeder-plant = 1.5. 
Therefore LWR plants have to reject about 50% 1 more heat to the aqueous environment 
than fossil-fuelled plants (HTGCR 14% less and an FBR 7% more) per kwh of electricity 
produced. For the same 'thermal' energy produced, the L WR heat rejections to the aqueous 
environment is about 28% more than the fossil-fuelled plant. 
(vi) In the Community, it is estimated that, in the future, nuclear power plants will supply an 
increasing proportion of the electricity provided by thermal sources 2 rising as follows : 
22% in 1975, 26% in 1980, 40% in 1985 and almost 80% 3 in 2000. 
(vii) In the industrialized countries, the need for electrical energy doubles about every 8-10 years; 
even if energy requirements in all their forms were to increase less rapidly in the future than 
in the recent past, it must be assumed that needs for electricity production will increase 
(22% of the total in 1970, and about 45% at the end of the century for the countries of the 
Community). 
(viii) For economic reasons, more and more powerful units are used in the construction of nuclear 
power stations, resulting in local concentrations of nuclear power stations, resulting in local 
concentrations of thermal discharges which are only slowly dissipated. 
(ix) A degradation in the ecological system of the waters into which the excess heat is released is 
in itself a loss which is difficult to quantify from the point of view of aesthetics, recreation, 
fishing, agriculture, etc. In addition, an increase in the temperature of waters which are 
already chemically or biologically polluted accelerates their degradation (e.g. the excessive 
development of algae leading to eutrophication) and finally their use for drinking or 
industrial water could be jeopardized once the self-purification mechanism is destroyed. 
(x) Likewise, the distribution of electricity from sites where the dissipation of heat presents 
no problems (the seaside or on estuaries) also affects the cost of electrical power at the point 
where it is used. The tendency towards industrial development in coastal regions, to the 
detriment of inland areas, may therefore be accelerated in the long run. 
(xi) Since, in spite of its enormous quantities, the thermal waste from power stations constitutes 
low-grade energy (small temperature difference), the possibilities of recuperation are very 
limited except in a few special cases. There are, in particular, the experiments now on hand 
aimed at using it for agricultural purposes and for raising some species of fish where a limited 
rise in temperature can have a beneficial effect. 
3. Survey of suitable methods of heat dissipation 
The main methods of obtaining cooling water for the condenser are the following : 
(1) Once-through direct cycle 
The fresh water (from the lake or river) passes through the condenser before being dis-
charged directly into the environment. This is the method normally used in the past, and is 
generally the most economical one. 
30 % more waste heat as compared to the conventional plant reject heat to both atmosphere and aquous 
environment. 
2 Conventional competitive sector: coal, petroleum products and natural gas (fossil fuels). 
3 Perhaps lower in certain countries (60 % in the U.K.) (Ref. 6). 
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(2) Artificial lakes or reservoirs 
The fresh water passes through the condenser and is discharged to allow the heat to be 
dissipated by radiation and convection before being returned to the condenser. Attention is 
tending more and more to turn towards this method as a means of heat dissipation. It is sometimes 
combined with a spray-type cooling system. 
(3) Salt-water cooling 
This type of cooling has also been used for many years. However, the problems of corrosion 
usually entail higher costs than freshwater cooling systems. 
(4) Cooling towers 
Wet cooling towers can be used if there are only limited supplies of cooling water. Here, 
most of the heat is dissipated by the natural or forced evaporation of a small proportion of the 
water from the condenser. This type of tower is most often used for large power stations; the natu-
ral circulation type is employed in particular in Europe and the ventilated, forced-circulation 
type in the United States (for economic reasons given below). 
(5) Air-cooling towers 
The principle on which dry cooling towers work is the direct transfer of heat to the ambient 
air via a tubular radiator. The construction of this type of tower is more costly than that of 
wet towers. 
4. Some advantages and drawbacks of certain commonly used cooling systems 
Each of the methods given above has its advantages and drawbacks from the environ-
mental point of view. First of all, with regard to costs, the situations in Europe and in the United 
States, for example, are not necessarily comparable. Unlike the United States' situation, the 
capital costs for the direct cycle fresh water system and for (wet) cooling towers are in Europe of 
the same order of magnitude. However, the cost of the power generated is about 5-6% higher 
in the case of cooling towers because of the reduction in the vacuum effect of the turbine. The 
increase in cost of energy produced lies with air cooling towers between 10% (natural circulation) 
and 15% (forced circulation). 
In the case of light-water nuclear power plants (PWR and BWR), the use of (dry) air 
cooling towers is unsuitable (because of the saturated steam from the turbine). However, for 
high-temperature reactors, with the possible future use of gas turbines, these air cooling towers 
have an advantage because of the increased temperature difference in relation to the cooling air. 
For water-cooled power plants, preference in Europe is given to natural-circulation (natural 
draft) wet cooling towers. Apart from the economic considerations entering into this choice, 
from the micro-climatological viewpoint the water vapour from this type of cooling system 
disperses quickly and the likelihood of the formation of low mist is substantially reduced. In 
addition, the capital cost of natural-circulation wet towers is lower. 
It is nevertheless quite possible that if construction costs in Europe rise and the cost of the 
generation of electricity continues to drop, 'forced' -circulation (mechanical draft) wet towers will 
become in the future economically interesting (cf. United States 1). 
In the U.S.A.: - wet mechanical draft tower:$ 10-12/kw; 
-- wet natural draft tower: $ 15-20/kw. 
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However, environmental problems could then arise, especially for plants in urban areas, 
because of the presence of various dusts and the formation of low mist. 
5. General Criteria (Standards) 
Basically each site has its own particularities and has to be assessed from the standpoint 
of waste heat dissipation on its own merit. It is therefore difficult to fix general criteria. 
Kevcrtheless, recently, some general guidelines have been issued in Western Germany for 
instance (Ref. 5). They can be summarized as follows: 
(i) the power plants' released cooling water should 'after mixing' never (in any season) heat up the 
aqueous medium by more than 3°C, exceptionally 5°C; 
(ii) the rejected cooling water should not exceed 30°C, exceptionally 35°C; 
(iii) the 'mixed' water should not exceed the following limits: 
(a) for waters having summer mean temperatures between 17°-20°C (and peak temperatures 
of 23oq : 250c. 
(b) for waters having summer peak temperatures of 25°C : 28°C. 
Usually these guide lines can easily be met. A point of controversy remams at what 
point downstream full 'mixing' is reached. 
Similar but rather more detailed criteria have been issued in the US (Ref. 28- Chapter II) 
by the National Technical Advisory Committee on 'Nater Quality Criteria. 
6. Local and global long-term effects 
6. 1 . General 
Like for the gaseous radioactive routine releases from a growing nuclear industry 
(Chapter II) the question of rejected waste heat can be considered from the point of view of the 
local effects on one hand and from the standpoint of global world-wide consequences. 
Notwithstanding the fact that, e.g. LWR nuclear power stations have to dissipate more 
waste heat than conventional power i.e. thermal production units the global as well as the local 
problem to be examined is not significantly different in both cases. 
6. 2. Global effects 
Rough illustrative estimates have heen made on the basis of electricity production 
forecasts. 
It seems that for some highly industrialized countries by the turn of the century a major 
portion of the available inland waters would be used for cooling purposes, assuming once-through 
direct cycle only were applied (about as high as 2/3 of all inland waters in the US; Ref. 28, 
Chapter II). The situation would probably be equivalent in Europe. However the ultimate 
heat sink for power generators is the atmosphere. If one assumes that at the plant sites the 
heat would all be rejected by water evaporation only, the inland water thus consumed would 
represent a minor fraction of the water available (about 1 % in the US; same reference). 
Another indicative example can be quoted. Solar radiation provides about 100 OOO times 
as much heat as all the electric energy currently produced in the world. Assuming no heat losses 
from the earth by radiation, the rise in the earth's temperature has been estimated to be about 
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3°C annually. On the same assumptions, all the heat released by conventional and nuclear 
power plants during the period from 1970 to 2000 would increase the earth's surface 
temperature by only 0.5°C and only after 10 000-100 OOO years of operation. 
It would seem therefore that no global problem arises as long as the artificial addition of heat 
on a planetary scale remains negligible in relation to solar thermal energy. 
In fact, a more serious problem in the long term, on the basis of global thermal considera-
tions and possible climatic changes, is that of the accumulation of C02 in the atmosphere (see 
Section II.D.2.) because of the disequilibrium between its formation and reabsorption, which 
may occur in future times. 
6. 3. Local effects 
Locally, the thermal problems are not negligible at all. For example, the artificial 
residual heat to be dissipated in an urban area has been estimated in the year 2000 to be about 
1.4 · 106 cal/m2 (500 Btu/sq.ft) to be compared with the heat received by solar radiation of 
2.8 · 106 cal/m2 (1 OOO Btu/sq.ft). However again this is not a specifically nuclear problem. 
The standards drawn up in various countries - for all methods of generating electricity 
and other industries producing residual heat - have resulted so far only in fairly general 
guidelines which could be made more detailed, for instance on the basis of research results and 
by the development of dispersion models and the correllated methods of calculation. 
The possible local thermal effects can only be countered by the suitable choice of sites 
and/or by additional methods of protection (artificial cooling). This will become more and more 
imperative, with the development of multi-unit sites. In this perspective, the development of 
sea-shore or off-shore sites may increase significantly for countries where such possibilities exist. 
The foreseeable medium and long-term perspectives of the development of HTGR and 
breeder-reactors are no doubt advantageous from the standpoint of thermal effects but are not 
to be considered a prerequisite for this reason. 
Finally it can be concluded that these problems are not a particularity of nuclear power 
production and therefore should be dealt with in the framework of any measure to protect 
against excessive thermal pollution from industrial sources in general. 
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CHAPTER V 
Accident potential, accident prevention and limitation 
of the possible consequences 
1. Precautions of administrative nature 
All nuclear installations, especially industrial ones, are subjected to strict control by various 
authorities responsible for granting building and operating licences according to the 
procedures and legal requirements in force in each country. Equivalent stringent precautions 
are seldom found in conventional (even hazardous) industrial activities or in the use of 
consumer goods (automobiles). 
2. Precautions of technical nature 
The common factor inherent in this type of control consists in a detailed in-depths 
analysis of the technical safety features of the installation as a whole and especially of the 
systems and equipment designed to limit the radiological or other consequences of all conceivable 
failures and accidents. 
The technical examination of the safety aspects is made firstly by the design group itself 
and then by the future operator of the installation. Subsequently, an independent 
investigation is carried out by the safety and control body delegated by the appropriate 
regulatory authorities and by any other Committees (e.g. the Advisory Commissions on Safety). 
This independent investigation results in comparison of the data and opinions supplied on the one 
hand by the promoters (designer and operator) and on the other by the safety and control 
bodies. A great deal of effort goes into this procedure. 
By way of illustration, can be noted, for an industrially advanced country : 
(i) all the work (design studies, compilation of safety reports, technical discussions with safety 
and control bodies) involved in obtaining an operating licence requires, on the part of the 
designer and the operator of a nuclear installation, about 240 man-months spread over about 
two years (Ref. 1). The normal amount of work which the safety and control bodies have to 
carry out in connection with the granting of an operation licence comes to at least 50 man-
years spread over three to five years. 
There is at present a tendency of even significantly more effort-input and lenghtier proce-
dures due to the environmental implications of nuclear power resulting from the so-called 
'nuclear controversy'. 
(ii) It is no simple matter to calculate the 'direct' costs involved in these licensing procedures, 
which include the development and engineering expenses forming an integral part of the 
design work. However, an estimate of the concomitant costs (Ref. 1) specifically connected 
with the licensing procedure yields the following breakdown : 
compilation of safety report 
meetings with safety and control bodies 
technical support (design studies, analyses) 
legal and administrative support 
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200 OOO u.a. (unit of account) 
100 OOO u.a. 
350 OOO u.a. 
100 OOO u.a. 
Total 750 OOO u.a. 
It may also be considered that these efforts and the confrontation between promoters and 
'safety and control' bodies lead to a plant design and limited operating conditions of a 
severity and conservatism unequalled in non-nuclear industries except for certain advanced 
technologies which are particularly costly and/or dangerous for professionally exposed 
employees (e.g., aeronautics and space travel). It is only since recently that equivalent detailed 
safety analyses are sometimes applied in hazardous conventional industry (e.g. petroleum and 
chemical industry). 
Operators and control bodies must also constantly control the quality requirements of 
equipment during manufacture, assembly and throughout prolonged operation (30-40 years). 
There is at present an increasingly marked tendency to develop - both nationally and 
internationally-, technological' standards 1 (criteria, codes and complementary requirements, 
guidelines, etc.), by means of which the methods of design and construction used and the imposed 
operating limits can be standardized. This tendency will undoubtely increase further with the 
development of nuclear power generation and the outlook of an international market of designs 
and equipment. 
In general terms, the safety analyses and efforts towards standardization connected 
therewith cover the following fields : 
(a) design analyses, which are important for the protection of professionally exposed and for 
public health and safety (e.g. qualitative and quantitative evaluations of systems reliability 
and insurance that the quality of the equipments will be adequately maintained throughout 
their useful life). Some examples are quoted: 
the treatment of effluents in 'normal' operation; reactor control and shutdown systems and 
the associated electronic and electromechanical equipment; power supply requirements; the 
maintenance of the quality of large mechanical components such as pressure vessel and 
primary piping; criticality control in reprocessing plants; the effectiveness of heat removal 
in irradiated fuel transportation containers. 
(b) analyses of 'abnormal: transients and major accidents, e.g. : reactivity transients and accidents; 
large leaks or breaks in the primary or secondary circuits; interactions between the primary 
heat transfer medium and the fuel; explosive occurrences in reprocessing plants, missile effects; 
drop and fire resistance of transportation containers. 
(c) design analyses or analyses of control methods specifically aimed at preventing abnormal 
transients or serious accidents, e.g. : reactivity limitations; special equipment to prevent 
rod dropping, methods of continuously detecting abnormalities; periodic surveillance and 
inspection; the redundancy of protective systems, protection against criticality accidents 
in reprocessing plants. 
(d) analyses of systems specifically intended to limit the consequences of abnormal transients 
or serious accidents (mitigating means, engineered safeguards); e.g. : emergency cooling sys-
tems (their reliability and effectiveness); secondary containments and engineered means of 
limiting the pressure, temperature or, possibly, explosive effects or shock waves; emergency 
ventilation and emergency electricity supplies. 
3. Conceivable serious radiological consequences 
In the case of industrial nuclear installations, potentially the largest accident hazard 
capable of affecting the general public (population 'at risk' and 'at large') will, for many years to 
come, be presented by power reactors. Generally, several types of potential accidents and the 
corresponding mitigating means form the subject of detailed analyses, which more and more 
1 As opposed to 'radiation' standards dealt with in Chapter II, for instance. 
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often incorporate probabilistic considerations such as comparative analyses of the reliability 
of protection and emergency systems or classifications of accidents according to their degree of 
severity (e.g. Ref. 5). 
Moreover, the probabilistic approach to the analysis of accidents, which tends to link the 
probability of events to the seriousness of the consequences (e.g., Ref. 2 and 3) also seems promis-
ing in the long run. However, the systematic and quantitative use of nuclear accident probabili-
ties which would be considered acceptable for the general public and the application of these 
acceptable (tolerable) risks as plant design 'target criteria' still gives rise to psychological problems 
(e.g., uncertainty of the statistical data used and compared with). 
For accidents of maximum conceivable seriousness 1, it is generally considered acceptable 
for an individual member of the population to receive 25 rem whole-body irradiation (somatic 
and genetic effects) and 15-25 rem of irradiation of the thyroid gland (a distinction sometimes 
being made between adult and child doses). The precautions limiting the effects of serious 
accidents on the environment (e.g., containment, ventilation and associated filtering systems) 
vary to a certain extent with the location and features of the reactor selected. Broadly speaking, 
however, it may be seen that, in this serious case, for a 1000 MWe plant, the total integrated 
individual irradiation doses lie between about 0.1 and 10 rem (mainly due to whole-body irradia-
tion by noble gases), whereas the accident doses due to radioactive iodine lie generally between 
0.01 and 0.1 rem (Ref. 4, numerous others and safety reports). 
With the medium and long-term development of FB reactors (e.g., sodium cooled - see 
Chapter I) the accident considerations will have to include more and more the Plutonium-hazard 2 
(likewise for thermal Pu-recycle). Whilst the iodine retention will probably be improved by the 
the presence of Sodium-vapour in accident conditions, the Plutonium can only be volatilized 
under aerosol (particulate) form. 
Preliminary calculations - assuming conservative release and dilution values (e.g. 0.5% 
containment leak rate, 100 m stack, 2 · 107 Ci m-3/Ci s-1 dilution) indicate in the vicinity of the 
plant (500 m) concentrations by a factor 100-1 OOO below the permissible concentrations for the 
public 'at risk' (Ref. 6). 
It is likely that more attention will in the future be given to accidents, which find their 
origin in 'external' causes, against which design did not explicitly protect (as opponent for example 
to seismic or flooding design). Examples of such external causes are airplane crash or even sabo-
tage. The assessment of these questions is certainly not easy to tackle. There is no doubt that 
here also probabilistic approaches will prove useful. A recent study (Ref. 9) has estimated for the 
particular BWR and PWR designs chosen in specific regional conditions (Switzerland), that the 
risk (frequency, activity release) would still be at least two orders of magnitudes below the pro-
posed tolerable risk-limit (Ref. 2) (see also Chapter VI). 
In general terms it should be pointed out, first that equivalent external hazards also exist 
for conventional industries and activities (chlorine tanks, explosives, hi-jacking, etc.), secondly 
that the way of protection of man against such hazards can therefore reasonably only be the same 
for both conventional and nuclear activities, e.g. location versus airplane landing strips, admini-
strative security measures, exceptional police measures, etc. 
4. Present and future siting implications 
The accident analysis doses thus obtained determine, together with the routine operation 
conditions (e.g. radioactive effluents, thermal effects, etc.), the acceptability of the chosen sites 
with regard e.g. to the present and foreseeable population distribution around the nuclear plants. 
1 Based on engineering judgement taking into account the state of the art (deterministic approach). 
For instance a 1 OOO MWe FER may contain an inventory of 8 . 106 CiPu and 80 . 106 Ci I-131. 
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It should be noted that : 
(i) 'Site criteria' (if based on 'accident' considerations) often lead to allowable 'exceptions' to 
the 'basic' requirements. 
(ii) Siting practices are rather divergent from one country to another (and even within one country) 
and are, from the safety standpoint mostly still dealt with on a 'case by case' basis, taking into 
account possible supplementary preventive or accident mitigating safeguards. This diver-
gence is, for instance, demonstrated in a recent paper comparing population distributions 
around nuclear power plant sites in the U.K. and the Community of Six (Ref. 7). 
In a growing nuclear industry there will be - in the next decade - need for nuclear power 
plants to develop more generally applicable site selection requirements based on 'routine' as well 
as 'abnormal' conditions'health and safety considerations. It is also likely that, with a growing 
fraction of ropulation 'at risk' (as compared to the rest of the population not living in the vicinity 
of a nuclear plant), the concept of integrated man-rem dose will become more usefully applied 
in the future. 
For fuel processing plants, the site selection will always remain a 'case' study based essen-
tially on the 'routine' operation conditions and certainly less related to the potential accident 
conditions. 
5. Present situation and future outlook 
Up to 1970, ninety power plants distributed over the whole world had produced 250 billion 
kWh of electricity and accumulated 650 years of experience without any significant accidents 
from the point of view of the population at large (Ref. 8). 
It may be hoped that this positive balance can be maintained with the development of 
the nuclear generation of power as a result of the continued application of strict standards and 
precautions and more stringent quality control. 
An assessment of the risk of damage involed in serious nuclear accidents is given in Chap-
ter VI. 
There is no doubt that, at present, the record of nuclear power as compared e.g. to conven-
tional hazardous industries (such as petroleum, chemical) is extremely favourable from the 
point of view of material damage, injury or death caused to the general public and from the point 
of view of professional accidents (see Chapter VI). With a growing nuclear industry and the 
development of higher ratings and of new technology (e.g. FBR's), the potential of accidents 
tends to increase and there is certainly, in this connection, merit in developing methods to assess 
quantitatively future 'risk-potential ranges'. However, it may be emphasized: 
(a) that this trend is not specific for the nuclear industry only, and applies certainly in similar 
porportion also for conventional industry and hazardous consumer goods; 
(b) that concurrently with nuclear power production increase and development of new technolo-
gies, increasingly expanded nuclear safety research programs are developed, of which a counter-
part is hardly to be found in the conventional field. 
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CHAPTER VI 
Nuclear hazards in relation to other risks 
The quantitative assessment of the hazards from normal operation or from accident-
conditions which could lead to material or bodily damage (to persons professionally exposed or 
to the population in general) must be considered with care because of the relative value of the 
interpretations placed on statistical information. A few comparative values are summarized 
here by way of example, showing how the nuclear energy 'hazard-potential' is situated in relation 
to other industries and human activities, the risk of which is generally accepted either individually 
or as a community. 
1. Risk in occupational duties 
1.1. Accidents 
Statistics extending over 22 years' operation 1 of various types of nuclear installations 
(laboratories, reactors, prototypes, etc.) and 2.5 · 109 man-hours show, for bodily injury involving 
inability to work : 7 693 individual cases, of which only 36 (0.5%) were due to effects of radiation. 
This gives an accident frequency rate of 
7693 
2.45 
2.5 · 109 
accidents per million man-hours, corresponding for the country concerned, to one-quarter of the 
national frequency rate for all industrial activities. 
Moreover, the partial frequency of accidents due to radiation is only 
36 
0.01 
2.5 · 109 
accident per million man-hours, which is clearly negligible in relation to the national frequency 
under consideration. 
Numerous statistics on various conventional professional (mining, industries) activities 
have been issued, some of which have been reported in Ref. (1) and (2). Grossly speaking such 
accidents have in industrialized countries an individual casualty (fatal injury) probability of 
about 10-4 per year at exposure and a permanent injury probability of about 10-2. 
Compared to this the nuclear industry is in a very favourable position, because of the high 
degree of health and safety precautions taken since the onstart of development onwards a quarter 
of a century ago. 
1 Symposium on accidental irradiation at place of work (26-29 April 1966: a review of criticality and reactor 
incidents at USAEC installations). 
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1.2. Normal operation 
However - as has been outlined already in section II.A.2. the 'normally' accumulated 
doses by professionally exposed may - remaining within the permissible radiation standards -
nevertheless in integrated man-rem, lead to a significant consumption. This will be more so with 
an expanding nuclear power production (especially for multi-unit sites) and associated industry. 
This problem has already been tentatively approached (Ref. 3 and 4) by assessing the social value 
of the man-rem concept and the economics involved in 'risk' acceptance based on this concept 
and in supplementary protective measures.It boils down to question for instance whether there 
is any biological difference between 50 occupational people receiving 3 rem/year or 150 persons 
receiving 1 rem/year (in both cases 150 man-rem) and how the total man-rem received compare 
to other industrial occupational risks. 
These considerations may become a further justification (besides those mentioned earlier 
with regard to the general public chapters II and V) for introducing also 'man-rem criteria' 
besides the individual dose limitations (basic standards). 
2. Nuclear risk in general in relation to other risks 
Table 11 below shows the likelihood of harmful effects to the public which may result 
from the use of nuclear power in relation to other risks readily accepted by human society. 
It would be well first of all to recall that a casualty-risk of 10-3 per person per year is 
generally considered unacceptable and means that steps must be taken to reduce it. At a 
figure of 10-4 per person per year we are prepared to spend money (generally public money) to 
eliminate the causes of accidents or mitigate their effects (e.g. traffic signals, publicity, police, 
fire precautions, etc.). 
Below a figure of 10-5 per person per year, risks are considered individual risks and are 
combatted by individual warnings (e.g. handling firearms, swimming, etc.). Risks of the order 
of 10-6 and below do not worry the population. 
Remarks to table 11 
1. The genetic hazards, which do not cause fatal injury in the true sense have not been included 
in this comparative table. However some indications (e.g. expressed in natural = genetic 
death = rate - extinction of a gene lineage) can be given on the basis of mutation rates 
and the genetic equilibrium of the population (cfr. Ref. 7 and 8). The normal mutation rate 
has been estimated at 200 OOO X 10-6 per person/generation. For an irradiation of 1 rad. 
7 200 x 10-6 induced mutations are considered possible, of which only 2.5% are expected in 
the first generation. 
This risk, of about 7 x 10-3, corresponds to accidental conditions (dose of the order of 
1-10 rem). For normal operating conditions, it would correspond (according to the 
conservative linearity hypothesis) to 7 X 10-7, i.e. once more a negligible value. 
2. The permissible doses or those actually received by persons professionally exposed to radiation 
and the general public may, for example, be compared with the genetic effects resulting from 
the consumption of coffee or alcohol (Ref. 10). Thus, the continuous consumption of 
six cups of coffee a day would correspond to the potential genetic damage equivalent to 
5 rem/year, whereas the consumption of 28 cm3 of alcohol per day would correspond to 
50 rem/year. 
Based on this information it is found that the individual risks resulting from nuclear 
energy in routine operations are negligible for the general public, as long as the presently 
applied stringent radiation standards are reported. As shown in previous chapters of this 
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papers there is no reason to believe that this would not be the case on a medium- and long-term 
basis. 
On the other hand, the conceivable most serious accident conditions lead to the class 
of risks where measures have to be taken. However the structural precautions taken in nuclear 
installations are at present usually such that the radiological consequences of accidents 
regarded as most serious and the least likely to occur still remain a factor of about 10 below 
(see section V.3.) the reference doses applied to arrive at the 10-3-10-4 risk value. 
TABLE 11 
Probabilities of individual fatal injury ( casualty) through conventional activities 
and causes and through the effects of radiation 
Type of risk 
Conventional (casualties only) 
- all diseases 
- motor accidents (automobiles) 
- total mortality risk 
- accidents of all types 
- smoking 
- traffic accidents (in general) 
- suicide 
-- falls 
- air pollution 
- industrial accidents 
- drowning 
- firearms 
- electricity 
- leukemia (natural causes) 
- poisoning 
- coal and oil-fired power stations 
(pollution) 
- cancer of thyroid (natural causes) 
- natural disasters 
- lightning 
Individual probability 
of fatal injury 
per year of exposure 
(orders of magnitude) 1 
10-2 
10-4 
10-3 (men) 10-4 (women) 
5 X 10-4 
5 X 10-4 
2.5 X 10-4 
2 X 10-4 
10-4 
10-4 
10-4 ( all ages) 
10-5 (age 20) 
3 X 10-5 
2 X 10-5 
2 X 10-5 
10-5 
10-5 
4 X 10-6 
10-6 
2 X 10-6 
5 X 10-7 
Remarks 
{ 
10-2 for light heavy and 
fatal injury 
1 Summary of data from various sources; with slight variations according to the country. 
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TABLE 11 (continuation) 
Type of risk 
Nuclear effects of radiation 
(individual injury, not necessarily casualty 
except perhaps with a long latent time) 
1 . Radiation in accident conditions 
(in the hypothesis such accident 
occurred; 'frequency' considerations) 
2. Radiation in normal operating con-
ditions 
Individual probability 
of fatal injury 
per year of exposure 
(orders of magnitude) 1 
10-3-10-4 
10-7 
Remarks 
1. Bases on a linear dose 
and risk relationship of 
30 x 10-6/person per 
rad for total irradiation 
and 1 (any age) to 
50 x 10-6 (child) per 
person per rad for 
effects on the thyroid 
gland (carcinoma) (Ref. 
7 and 8). 
2. For doses generally con-
sidered acceptable m 
accident conditions of 
25 rem (total irradia-
tion) and 15-25 rem in 
the thyroid are taken 
into account for this 
risk. 
1. At the rate of 1 to a 
few mrem/year, e.g., 
individual mean doses 
received around a nu-
clear installation. 
2. Estimated on the basis 
of ICRP data; linear 
extrapolation with dose 
and decreasing dose 
rate. 
1 Summary of data from various sources; with slight variations according to the country. 
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3. Risk on a medium- and long-term basis - probabilistic approaches 
It is difficult to define accurately the quantified probabilities of occurence of various types 
of accidents which would result in consequences to the environmental population and in particular 
to fix a clear-cut border-line between conceivable and inconceivable accidents. At worst 
one could speak about radioactive material releases exceeding even largely the doses considered 
acceptable for emergency purposes (without evacuation requirements) mentioned earlier. 
Attempts have been made semi-quantitatively or quantitatively to solve this question. 
For instance in ref. (11) and ref. (2) - chapter V, the principle is to apply an arbitrary (but 
reasonably defined) inverse relationship between accident 'frequency' and release magnitude 
and to apply this to urban, semi-urban and remote sites taking into account the severity of 
injury which could be caused by the respective release magnitudes, the population densities and 
the nuclear power production growth requirements. 
To compare with non-nuclear risks it has been suggested in such case (Ref. 11) to compare 
with 'crowd-type' of accident-hazards. A comparison with estimates on random crashes of 
aeroplanes around airfields (a risk between 1 to 100 casualties per crash) would for instance 
indicate a risk two orders of magnitude less for a semi-urban sited nuclear power plant 
programme. The latter would be about the same as the risk of death from meteorites. 
Perhaps the most appropriate approach to be made for 'unlikely' (or inconceivable) 
nuclear reactor accidents is - rather than to compare with rather frequent recurrent conven-
tional hazards affecting a relatively small number of people - to compare with man-made 
constructions potentially affecting 'large' groups of the population (e.g. dam-type developments). 
An interesting example which was recently quoted (Ref. 4) refers to the Netherlands 'Schelde-
river Delta plan' : this plan has to protect about 1 mns of inhabitants; assuming an 
'inconceivable' flood happens once in 10 OOO years and causes casualties in 0.1 % of the 
population then the risk is about 10-7 1. This seventh order of risk is accepted by society with 
regard to the benefits. Such catastrophy-type of accidents of nuclear power plants leading to 
casualties are of the same order of magnitude or even less. 
Another similar example of a risk, which is in Western Europe readily accepted and will 
never lead to supplementary precautions (structural, warning systems, etc.) can be put forward. 
On November 13th 1972 a storm hit Western Europe with wind speeds up to 125 m/sec on the 
continent. This is about the most severe hurricane force one can note over long periods of time 
in this moderate climate region. The last time a storm of equivalent severity affected widely 
the British Isles and the Continent was in November 1940 with wind spreads up to 150 m/sec. 
Both these storms caused casualties, injuries and material damage, but only on the latest 
one information is available; as to the 1940 storm little attention was paid, presumably because 
of war conditions. Confining ourselves to the 'casualties' out of a population of roughly 
200 mio affected, about 54 persons were killed. This risk spread out over the period between 
1940 up to now (roughly 30 years) amounts to about 10-s casualty risk/person-year. It should 
also be borne in mind that this is certainly a 'non-benefit' type of risk, as opposed to the 
previous examples. The risk here is two orders of magnitude more than that expected from 
catastrophy type of accidents from nuclear power. 
This type of estimation and comparison with nuclear power requires undoubtedly 
further examination but they are inherently attractive on a long-term basis. 
Once more in such probabilistic estimations, the man-rem concept may prove to become 
useful, as total body irradiation has to be considered, besides the thyroid - carcinoma effects 
which would result from important Iodine releases taken mainly as reference so far (Ci I-131 
equivalent). 
1 I0-4 /ycar x 103 /106 persons= I0-7/person-year. 
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